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Executive Summary 
The 2017 NSF Cybersecurity Summit for Large Facilities and Cyberinfrastructure (CI) continued 
to build a trusting, collaborative community working to address core cybersecurity challenges in 
support of NSF science. The 2017 summit built on the success, findings, and lessons learned 
from previous years, and focused on the theme of “​Ensuring Data Provenance, Integrity and 
Resilience​”. The program committee and presentations submitted by community members 
drove the program. A call for participation (CFP) resulted in thirty seven (37) proposals 
consisting of: 15 plenary topics, and 11 training sessions, 6 student applications and 5 table 
talks. For the third year in the row, the summit received a marked increase in CFP proposals, 
again exceeding our capacity to accommodate them all.  
The 2017 summit took place in Arlington, VA, August 15th through midday August 17th. On 
August 15th, it offered a full day of training. The second and third days consisted of plenary 
sessions designed to address the theme of “Ensuring Data Provenance, Integrity and Resilience” 
in the context of cyberinfrastructure projects and Large Facilities.  
One hundred twenty three individuals attended the summit, with 48 individuals -- more than 
one third of all registrants -- participating in planning, speaking, providing training, co-authoring 
a CFP submission, and/or leading a lunch table talk. In all, 56 NSF-funded projects, including 18 
Large Facilities, were represented. Attendee evaluations and feedback were overwhelmingly 
positive and constructive. 
The 2017 summit continued to make progress on the recommendations and opportunities 
defined at the 2016 summit, identifying findings, recommendations, and future challenges for 
the NSF community. A full list of findings, recommendations, and future challenges is 
delineated in Section 4 of this report, but the following are the key recommendations derived 
from the 2017 summit: 
Recommendation 1: ​NSF projects should have budgets for cybersecurity in the range of 3-12% 
of total IT budget. Projects with cybersecurity budgets below that range should carefully 
consider the appropriateness of their budget. 
Recommendation 2: ​NSF projects should engage and incorporate stakeholders and senior 
leadership into the information security risk acceptance and risk management processes. This 
should include explicitly delineating responsibilities and accountability among the relevant 
actors. 
Recommendation 3: ​NSF projects should look to a broader range of cybersecurity standards 
and frameworks when selecting what will provide the best fit for their mission. 
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Recommendation 4: ​NSF projects should continue to refine Risk-based approaches to help 
provide the most nuanced and applicable information to cybersecurity stakeholders, and may 
wish to draw from a broader range of sources, such as the AFCEA Economics of Cybersecurity 
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Organizers’ Thoughts 
We continue to be extremely happy with the impact the summit is having in terms of bringing 
the community together, soliciting responses to the call for participation, and fostering sharing 
experiences amongst the community. We thank the community members who enable this 
success through their participation at the summit. In particular we thank those who serve on 
the program committee.  
This year interest in the summit hit a record high, representing a 20% increase in attendance 
over 2016. We’re excited to see a third year of growth in community participation and response 
to the call for proposals, again exceeding the program’s capacity to accommodate. We do 
believe however that we, the program committee, and the community should not become 
complacent. With our established trust and sense of community, we should consider and 
continue to refine our ongoing and long-term goals to ensure we continue to produce new 
successes as well as adapt to changes in the cybersecurity and NSF landscapes. We will 
continue to evolve and adjust the summit in order to meet the community's changing needs. 
Next year we'll follow the NSF office move and hold the summit to Alexandria, VA. We note that 
while community interest in the summit was the strongest in history, NSF participation hit a low 
with only nine employees attending. With declining participation from the NSF, the program 
committee may consider holding future summits in other locations that have been requested 
by the community. Additionally, with the increased growth of the summit, we plan on charging 
a registration fee in 2018 to offset the added costs. 
Finally, we thank the program committee members for their hard work and devotion to the 
summit, and we thank NSF for funding the summits and providing presentations. 
-2017 Summit Organizers: Leslee Cooper, Ryan Kiser, Mark Krenz, Jim Marsteller, Amy 
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1 Background: Evolving Cybersecurity Landscape, and 
Advancing Trustworthy Science 
CTSC, now in its sixth year, reestablished the annual NSF cybersecurity summit as a means to 
reinvigorate the NSF cybersecurity community and increase trust in the science supported by 
that community. The summit serves as a valuable tool for securing NSF scientific 
cyberinfrastructure (CI) and increasing trust in the science it supports by providing a forum for 
education, sharing experiences, and building community. For many attendees, the summits are 
unique opportunities to come together with their colleagues, to benchmark and debate 
cybersecurity best practices, and to receive practical, relevant training. 
Although the summit offers value across the community, it is of particular value and 
importance to NSF-funded cybersecurity professionals, NSF Program Officers, and Trusted CI. 
The summit offers a forum for these diverse stakeholders to come together and share 
experiences, identify common challenges, and network. The summit also provides a venue for 
the development of an NSF cybersecurity community, increasing collaborations and 
connections between diverse institutions. Moreover, the summit presents an excellent 
opportunity to highlight cybersecurity challenges to program officers, leadership, and 
stakeholders, as well as provide basic cybersecurity awareness and educations functions. 
Finally, the summit presents an opportunity for Trusted CI to gather insight into the needs, 
concerns, and challenges facing the community. 
The constantly changing state of cybersecurity is one that can be challenging for any 
organization, whether commercial, academic or governmental. Florence Hudson, Senior Vice 
President & Chief Innovation Officer of Internet 2, observed at the conclusion of the summit 
that some things in our environment haven’t changed while others have and suggested further 
exploration. Rapidly changing technology (e.g., Internet of Things; Cloud Services) and 
ever-evolving and diverse threats present new challenges, while others, such as economic 
challenges and workforce readiness, have existed for some time. 
Addressing these challenges is fundamental for supporting and advancing trustworthy science. 
During the summit opening, Director of the Office of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure (OAC) Irene 
Qualters highlighted the core principles of promoting science excellence and focusing on 
unique NSF contributions to CI, enabling fundamentally new scientific advances, and 
incorporating new approaches and technologies to support these OAC principals. 
Ms. Qualters also shared responses to the 2030 strategy development process request for 
information (RFI) that will impact the future landscape of cyberinfrastructure. The responses 
seek a vision of the future with an integrative ecosystem, built on robust, secure, and dynamic 
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workflows and data flows across diverse technologies and boundaries. This ecosystem would 
include multi-institutional authentication for distributed communities and at-scale security 
approaches for research communities. Other themes included trustworthy software and data 
for robust and reliable science, emphasis on both human and technical capabilities, and finally, 
commitment to continuity of CI and links to research. The results from the survey show the 
need for ongoing integration of new technologies and increasing collaborative frameworks, all 
of which must be evaluated and implemented in a secure fashion to advance trustworthy 
science. 
The 2017 summit took place Tuesday, August 15th through midday Thursday, August 17th, at 
the Westin Arlington Gateway near NSF. On August 15th, the summit offered a full day of 
training that included a record-high six parallel sessions. The second and third days followed a 
workshop format designed to identify both the key cybersecurity challenges facing Large 
Facilities and the most effective responses to those challenges. The event brought together 
leaders in NSF CI and cybersecurity communities to continue the processes initiated in 2013: 
building a trusting, collaborative community, and seriously addressing that community’s core 
cybersecurity challenges. 
The remainder of this report is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the summit’s purpose, 
scope, and theme; Section 3 provides summaries of the presentations; Section 4 identifies the 
Findings, Recommendations, and Future Challenges identified from the Summit; Section 5 lists 
the organizanizing and program committee; Section 6 replicates the CFP and summit program; 
Section 7 provides details on the summit’s attendance and participation; Section 8 provides the 
results of attendees’ evaluations of the event, and Section 9 catalogues lessons learned. The 
report concludes with the closing thoughts of the organizers. 
 
2 The Summit’s Purpose, Scope, and Theme 
The theme of ​“Ensuring Data Provenance, Integrity and Resilience”​ was selected by the 
program committee for the 2017 summit. The theme was introduced during the first keynote, 
“A Workflow-Centric Approach to Increasing Reproducibility and Data Integrity” (see Section 3), 
where Jeff Spies delved into the moral and ethical impact scholarly values had on data integrity. 
Marjory Blumenthal’s keynote, “Data, data, everywhere—how shall we live with it?”, reinforced 
the theme directing the audience's attention to big data and the need for privacy based on 
provenance. Not only did Marjory point out that the subject (the data user) rarely has a 
relationship with the data collector, but she expanded on the summit’s theme by suggesting a 
new attribute or metric, veracity, which could be used to reflect the accuracy of the data. 
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Similarly, two panels, “Cybersecurity in the Face of Overwhelming Threats and Cloud Security” 
and “NSF Partnerships with Cloud Providers” further pushed the scope of the summit beyond 
the need to understand how provenance, integrity and resilience affect data to additionally 
exploring and sharing mechanisms to ensure its security. The first discussed measures and 
techniques science projects should undertake to secure data in the face of adversaries, while 
the latter presented approaches major Cloud service providers currently implement to ensure 
data security. 
The 2017 summit built on the recommendations of past summit reports,  which we’ve 1
documented in section 4 of this report ​“Progress Towards Priority Recommendations”. 
We believe the summits are critical in supporting measurable progress on the following goals: 
identifying, establishing and sharing community standards for best practices regarding 
cybersecurity; providing pragmatic levels of information security; meaningfully addressing 
software assurance, quality or supply chains in the context of the project cybersecurity 
programs; and supporting scientific discovery. 
 
3 Summit Program Summaries 
 
A Workflow-Centric Approach to Increasing Reproducibility and Data Integrity​ - Jeff Spies 
delivered the first keynote. His presentation discussed the need for increased research 
efficiency, quality, inclusivity, and diversity, by highlighting that a gap exists between scholarly 
values and practices. Specifically, that peer review introduces bias. To combat this, he argued 
that the science community needs to focus more on replicability, that is, holding methods 
constant than to reproducibility that attempts to hold data constant. Moreover, his findings 
showed that the lack of replicability is tied to the desire and need for scientist to get their 
research published. Jeff concluded by questioning whether or not we can address the 
incentives for science by moving peer review to immediately after the theory governing the 
research, but before the data generation process in order to remove bias in the latter phase. 
 
From Bare Metal to Virtual: Lessons Learned when a Supercomputing Institute Deploys Its 
First Cloud​ - Evan F. Bollig presented on their experiences at the Minnesota Supercomputing 
Institute (MSI). His talk not only described the lessons learned when the MSI launched it’s first 
cloud-based platform to support research with specific data use agreements, but it also 
addressed issues concerning accountability, risk acceptance, and the role of project leadership 
1 See the 2015 summit report, agenda, and more at ​http://trustedci.org/2015summit/ 
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when a large supercomputing facility deviates from its traditional base of support. 
Key issues from his talk centered on their virtualization software not being able to satisfy four 
core needs: on-demand resources, long-running jobs, container-based computing, and NIH 
Controlled data (dbGaP) ¾ petabyte of data. Similarly, Minnesota’s OIT was not prepared to 
handle controlled data. These challenges forced MSI to re-evaluate requirements and planning. 
Cornell Red Cloud: Campus-based Hybrid Cloud Computing​ - Steven Lee relayed concerns 
around securing hybrid cloud systems for research, while focusing on lessons learned from 
architecting and implementing Cornell’s Red Cloud service, a Eucalyptus-based cloud system 
which provides a set of virtual machine systems for users with non-traditional computational 
needs that is API-compatible with Amazon services. The session covered some of the practical 
cybersecurity concerns with running a hybrid cloud system. 
Cybersecurity in the Face of Overwhelming Threats​ - Von Welch, moderator, and panelists, 
Michael Corn (UCSD), Anita Nikolich (NSF), and Kim Milford (REN-ISAC) discussed in the first 
panel what a science project should do in the face of being targeted by an adversary with 
significant (more than the project has) resources, who is very motivated and has access to 
significant “cyber weapons” (vulnerabilities, malware, social engineering techniques). Similarly, 
what should the community do if one of those threat’s persistent attention was to be turned on 
to a project in the NSF community? 
The panelist addressed these questions by first emploring that research projects make certain 
that they have sufficient methods in place, e.g., backups, incident response, to ensure the 
survival of the data A secondary recommendation was stronger NSF requirements for securing 
NSF projects. 
HTCondor​ - Todd Tannenbaum delivered a "lessons learned" type talk about the 
security-related challenges HTCondor has faced and the resulting mistakes, solutions, and 
policies developed during the past 20 years of creating and distributing HTCondor. Topics 
included what security-related policies and procedures that every production software project 
should have in place, and an overview of some of the time-tested processes evolved within the 
HTCondor team on vulnerability response, personnel organization, and defensive coding. Topics 
were presented first as a description of the problem to be addressed, and while some of the 
material was aimed at software engineers, most of the presentation was at a level easily 
approachable by non-developers such as project managers and principle investigators without a 
computer science background. 
A lost maxim that was conveyed, was that security hygiene is not just for projects that use the 
internet, run as root, or have sensitive data, for tools that appear to have banal security 
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requirements can be leveraged as agents to compromise and escalate permissions within a 
system. Moreover, Todd espoused on the challenges in communicating and mitigating 
vulnerabilities within an open-source environment, without furthering the possibilities of 
attacks due to its public nature. 
Strategies to Develop a Diverse and Inclusive Cybersecurity Pipeline​ - moderator Tony Baylis, 
along with panelists, Aurelia Williams (Norfolk State University), Victor Piotrowski (NSF), 
Rodney Petersen (NIST), and Ambareen Siraj (Tennessee Tech University/WiCyS) explored 
efforts and initiatives employed to grow, recruit, and educate a diverse and inclusive pipeline of 
cybersecurity professionals for our workforce needs. For without the full participation of a 
diverse workforce, the economic viability of the nation is threatened and the creativity to shape 
future technology is lost. 
The panelist conveyed that several programs, specifically in training cybersecurity specialists, 
are instantiated in both the NSF and NIST. Additionally, WICSY (Women in Cybersecurity) and 
some college and university curriculums are available to encourage minorities to pursue an 
education in cybersecurity. Questions that were presented to the panelist focused on 
awareness to potential students and tapping into the resources developed by the programs. 
Beyond the Beltway: The Problems with NIST’s Approaches to Cybersecurity and Alternatives 
for NSF Science​ - Craig Jackson, Bob Cowles, and Scott Russell spoke about and examined the 
differences between RMF, SP 800-171, and CSF, and postulated that they are inefficient and 
ineffective approaches to cybersecurity and cyber resilience. To support this, they offered 
perspectives from the DoE, defense and legal communities. Moreover, they showed that NIST’s 
products are ill-suited to the resources of NSF science projects. Finally, the speakers 
commented on alternate choices that could be adopted, including, CIS’s Critical Security 
Controls and the Australian government’s Essential Eight. 
Finding Your Way in the Dark: Security from First Principles​ - Susan Suns introduced a mental 
model for reasoning about security instead of trying to memorize for security and demonstrate 
its application to real-world examples. Her goal was for attendees to leave looking at the 
technologies and human systems around them a little differently. 
Susan’s main focus was the idea of using principles, including: comprehensivity, opportunity, 
rigor, minimization, compartmentation, fault tolerance, and proportionality, to teach people to 
“​think like a security practitioner​”. 
Data, data, everywhere—how shall we live with it?​ - Marjory Blumenthal gave the second 
keynote. Her talk centered on big data and its need for privacy. It was postulated that privacy 
policy within the US is legislated on “small data”, where the subject has a relationship with the 
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data collector. However, with ease of storing and collecting big data, the relationship could be 
nonexistent. This is especially prevalent to online education, health care, and smart homes, 
where it is unclear how the collected data is being used, or by whom.  
Marjory additionally introduced a new attribute to the canonical CIA (confidentiality, integrity 
and availability), referred to as veracity that reflects the accuracy of the data. She closed the 
discussion stating possible directions for solutions, suggesting both better tools to support 
anonymization and encryption, as well as stronger legislature. 
Cloud Security & NSF Partnerships with Cloud Providers​ - moderator Susan Ramsey, panelists 
Susie Adams (Azure/Microsoft), Mark Ryland (AWS), and Matthew O’Connor (Google) 
participated in the last panel of the Summit. The panel provided an opportunity for Cloud 
vendors to discuss their approach in handling data integrity within the Cloud. The importance of 
this discussion is justified by the increasing requirement of universities to comply with NIST 
800-171 CUI, or FISMA, along with other stipulations or costs that are driving the universities to 
use Cloud solutions. 
One revelation that came from this panel was that all three service providers incorporated 
differing levels of accreditation to FISMA, FedRAMP and 800-171, although the reasons behind 
the varying levels was less clear. However, having a mechanism to provide feedback to NIST 
was suggested as a possible solution. Moreover, it was reasoned that FISMA and FEDRAMP are 
controls-based, where as the Cloud providers base much of their security on anomaly detection 
in an effort to protect data where it lives. 
The Applicability of HPC for Cyber Situational Awareness​ - Leslie Leonard discussed the High 
Performance Computing Modernization Program (HPCMP), a central resource for expertise in 
the application of high-end computing to the Department of Defense’s most challenging 
problems. She spoke on their high-level goals, research challenges, and anticipated results for 
cyber SA using the HPC Architecture for Cyber Situational Awareness (HACSAW), which is a 
HPCMP developed initiative to leverage HPC to advance emerging challenges for Cyber 
Situational Awareness (SA). She showed how HACSAW can provide a computational and data 
rich environment to researchers and collaborators to test, develop, model, measure and refine 
data-driven analytics. Additionally, that his environment will be the proving ground for novel 
ideas, algorithms and approaches that are suitable for large scale execution with dedicated 
HPC. 
Internet2 NOC Risk Assessment ​- Paul Howell provided a baseline security risk assessment of 
the Internet2 network and Network Operations Center (NOC) that identified specific 
improvements designed to better protect the network and the services dependent upon the IT 
from attacks. He related on several critical improvements that improved the network’s 
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resistance to attack, and further showed how these efforts could yield a sustainable security 
program that would enable Internet2 to appropriately manage the risks from increasingly 
sophisticated and targeted attacks and promote a culture of security.  
4 Progress Towards Priority Recommendations 
The 2017 Summit continued to make progress on Recommendations and Opportunities set out 
in past summits, while also introducing new important themes and issues to the community.  
The remainder of this section is broken into three parts: Section 4.1, “Findings,” will lay out 
factual information collected from the current year’s summit; Section 4.2, “Recommendations,” 
will offer specific guidance to the community based on this year’s Findings and past years’ 
Findings and Recommendations; and Section 4.3 “Future Challenges,” will suggest important 
work that still needs to be done in the community and offer potential themes and topics for 
future summits.  
4.1 Findings 
Findings are factual determinations made as a result of the Summit. Findings serve to provide 
insight into the cybersecurity landscape of the NSF Community, and help form the basis for 
Recommendations and Future Challenges.  
4.1.1 Risk Management: 
The 2017 Summit came away with a number of findings regarding the adoption and 
implementation of risk management processes. There was widespread agreement that 
incorporating stakeholders and leadership into the risk management process is important for 
NSF science facilities. Similarly, there appeared to be consensus that more explicit 
incorporation of proportionality and mission concerns into risk management was valuable for 
building stakeholder support. Finally, several participants voiced a need to more explicitly 
prioritize risks given their limited resources.  
However, there was still some disagreement regarding risk management frameworks, 
particularly regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of NIST approaches, with numerous 
speakers and panelists voicing criticisms of the NIST approaches, while others proved more 
supportive of these standards. 
4.1.2 Baseline Security: 
A second area of findings related to establishing a baseline set of controls for security 
programs. Specific controls that were suggested included two-factor authentication, periodic 
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risk assessments, and restricting privileged access/implementing least privilege. However, 
several other controls frequently were discussed, including audits (viewed by some as more 
valuable than outright prevention controls), bug bounty programs, and placing a greater 
emphasis on system architecture rather than focusing on code. 
4.1.3 Regulation: 
The spectre of regulation was a third area of findings. Controlled data (PHI, CUI, PII, etc.) was a 
particular concern, and most institutions who are already managing controlled data identify it is 
a source of problems. In addition, a recurring sentiment was that most regulations have not 
kept pace with technological changes, and prove inflexible for those who must adhere to them. 
Several institutions voiced interest in building partnerships or in outsourcing cybersecurity 
functions completely (e.g. through cloud providers) as a means to avoid dealing with 
regulations directly.  
4.1.4 Summit Impact: 
Finally, there was considerable agreement regarding the value the Summit and its related 
cybersecurity materials provide to the community. The Large Facility Manual security section 
was touted as valuable resource, with its primary shortcoming being its lack of visibility for the 
broader community. Similarly, summit trainings were extremely popular, and prompted several 
comments about increasing the number of and access to trainings. Suggestions included more 
in person training during the summit, online access to summit trainings, and additional online 
training offered throughout the year. Finally, the Summit more broadly had a direct impact on 
most attendees, with a clear majority identifying themselves as having at least one action item 
in response to the Summit. 
4.2 Recommendations 
Based on the findings of this year’s summit and the accumulated findings and 
recommendations from past years’ summits, (listed in Appendix A), we have come to the 
following recommendations for the NSF science community. Recommendations are intended to 
offer specific guidance to the broader NSF community, and should serve as a foundation for 
recommendations for future summits. 
4.2.1 Budgets 
The importance of information security budgets has been a recurrent topic within the NSF 
community. The issue of budgets was raised at the 2015, 2016, and 2017 summits, including a 
specific presentation by Jackson, Cowles, and Russell in 2016. Furthermore, the 2015 and 2016 
Reports both list as Recommendation 1 that “The NSF CI and Large Facility community should 
 
Report of the 2017 NSF Cybersecurity Summit for Large Facilities and Cyberinfrastructure 15 
 
develop a broadly applicable strategy for information security budgets, including how, why, and 
where it does what it does in terms of spending.” Less formally, a number of presentations and 
discussions included conversations of budgets. 
Based on this recurring importance, and the compiled findings of three years of summits, we 
reach our first recommendation: 
Recommendation 1: ​NSF projects should have budgets for cybersecurity in the range of 
3-12% of total IT budget. Projects with cybersecurity budgets below that range should 
carefully consider the appropriateness of their budget. 
4.2.2 Risk Management 
Understanding and applying risk management concepts has been a recurrent concern for the 
NSF science community. Questions related to appropriate and effective risk management have 
been raised at the previous four summits, with Recommendation 2 (2014), Recommendation 4 
(2014), Recommendation 3 (2015, 2016), Recommendation 5 (2015, 2016), and 
Recommendation 6 (2015, 2016) all relating to risk management. Furthermore, a number of 
presentations and comments have spoken either directly or indirectly on the need to better 
understand and engage in risk management practices.  
Based on this recurring importance, we reach our second recommendation: 
Recommendation 2: ​NSF projects should engage and incorporate stakeholders and 
senior leadership into the information security risk acceptance and risk management 
processes. This should include explicitly delineating responsibilities and accountability 
among the relevant actors.  
4.2.3 Risk Management Resources 
The community’s interest and engagement with risk management topics has also led to 
considerable interest in specific risk management frameworks to help structure risk-based 
decision making. The issue of whether and what specific frameworks to adopt, their strengths 
and limitations, and anecdotal experiences implementing them has been a popular topic for 
discussion. Recommendation 5 (2015, 2016) highlighted the need for the community to adopt a 
broadly applicable framework, and specific presentations in 2015, 2016, and 2017 all addressed 
the potential benefits and drawbacks of specific frameworks offered by NIST, such as the Risk 
Management Framework, Cybersecurity Framework, and Special Publication 800-53. 
Based on this ongoing and unsettled discussion, we selected our third recommendation:  
Recommendation 3: ​NSF projects should look to a broader range of cybersecurity 
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standards and frameworks when selecting what will provide the best fit for their 
mission. 
Furthermore, numerous presentations highlighted potential cybersecurity resources, with the 
CIS Critical Security Controls, Australian Signals Directorate Essential 8, Information Security 
Practice Principles, and AFCEA Economics of Cybersecurity all offering unique and useful 
cybersecurity perspectives. While these sources are not intended to be definitive or exhaustive, 
they offer value to the community and should be considered when engaged in risk 
management processes. 
Based on this growing body of sources, we reach our fourth recommendation: 
Recommendation 4: ​NSF projects should continue to refine Risk-based approaches to 
help provide the most nuanced and applicable information to cybersecurity 
stakeholders, and may wish to draw from a broader range of sources, such as the AFCEA 
Economics of Cybersecurity and the Information Security Practice Principles.  
4.3 Future Challenges 
Additionally, we would like to highlight areas of current concern, note, or interest that we 
believe should serve as springboards for future discussions and collaborations in the broader 
community. Future Challenges are intended to be more open ended, and should prompt 
discussion and consideration in the broader community. Although we expect these “Future 
Challenges” to serve as part of our calculus when accepting CFPs in future summits, they will 
still only be one factor in a multi-factor test. 
Challenge 1:​ (Cloud Computing Information Sharing)The NSF CI and Large Facility 
community should explore ways to more effectively share information regarding cloud 
computing platforms. This should include information about the use of third party 
providers, and about running your own cloud systems. 
Challenge 2: ​(Collaboration)​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should find more 
ongoing ways of collaboratively developing and maintaining cybersecurity programs, 
such as sharing materials, services, practices, lessons learned, and collaborative/peer 
reviews.  
Challenge 3:​ ​(Identity Management)​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should 
continue to develop and disseminate best practices for identity and access management 
to support research. 
Challenge 4: (​Artificial Intelligence) The NSF CI and Large Facility community should 
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explore the role that Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and other advances in 
automation may play in the future.  
Challenge 5: ​(Privacy) The NSF CI and Large Facility community should continue to 
determine the impact of privacy on their projects. New data protection regulations such 
as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) may affect projects collecting data on 
European people. 
Challenge 6: ​(SWA) The NSF CI and Large Facility community should determine its 
software assurance, quality, and supply chain requirements, and determine whether 
their goals regarding software security may yield some unmet requirements in this 
space. 
 
5 The Organizing and Program Committees 
The 2017 summit was organized and hosted by ​the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence​, and 
six members of that project (Ryan Kiser, Jim Marsteller, Mark Krenz, Amy Starzynski Coddens, 
Diana Borecky and Von Welch) along with Leslee Cooper, the Administrative Director for the IU 
Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, served as the organizing committee. We recruited a 
Program Committee (PC) made up of key leaders from NSF CI projects and the broader 
community. The PC was to be responsible for setting the agenda and inviting speakers, 
evaluating and selecting from among proposed training, talks and panels, extending invitations 
to expert presenters, participating actively in the event itself, and laying the framework for 
successful post-summit evaluation and community support. Jim Marsteller served as chair of 
the PC, a role he has held in prior summits. The PC held 14 meetings by conference call 
beginning March 13, 2017 and ending August 28, 2017. It conferred electronically both prior to 
and following this time period, with monthly meetings.  
The 2017 PC members were: 
● Steve Barnet, ​Senior System Administrator for the IceCube Neutrino Observatory.  
● Anthony (Tony) Baylis​, Assistant Department Manager for the Computing Applications 
and Research Department in the Computation Directorate at Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory. 
● Michael Corn​, CISO of the University of California at San Diego where he manages the 
Security Office as well as the Identity and Access Management.. 
● Rion Dooley,​ Principal investigator on the Agave Project a Science-as-a-Service API 
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platform allowing researchers worldwide to manage data, run code, collaborate freely, 
and integrate their science anywhere. 
● Barbara Fossum​, NEES deputy center director and former managing director of Purdue 
University’s Cyber Center and Computer Research Institute. 
● Dr. David Halstead​, CIO for the National Radio Astronomy Observatory. His 
responsibilities are divided between Data Management for the Observatory’s HPC 
infrastructure in support of the national radio telescopes, and the general IT support for 
NRAO’s 500+ employees.  
● Ardoth Hassler​, Associate Vice President of University Information Services & Executive 
Director, Office of Assessment and Decision Support at Georgetown University and 
former Senior Information Technology Advisor in the Office of the Chief Information 
Officer in the NSF Office of Information and Resource Management, Division of 
Information Systems. 
● Susan Ramsey​, Risk Assessor and Security Engineer at the National Center for 
Atmospheric Research.  
● George Strawn​, NAS as board director for the Board on Research Data and Information, 
Formerly NSFnet program director and then division director of networking), then CISE 
executive officer and acting assistant director, and then served as CIO. He was detailed 
to OSTP in 2009 where he served as director of the NITRD NCO. 
 
6 The Call for Participation and Program 
The full agenda and biographies are attached to this report as Appendices A and B . 2
The PC issued a call for participation (CFP) to the community requesting submissions in the 
form of: (a) white papers one to five pages in length, focused on unmet cybersecurity 
challenges, lessons learned, and/or significant successes, (b) one to two-page abstracts for 
proposed half and full-day trainings, (c) one to two page abstracts for proposed table talk 
sessions, or (d) student applications.  Additionally, the PC invited specific community leaders as 3
2 The full summit program is also available on the CTSC website, 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5047a5a6e4b0dcecada15549/t/598e0aa03e00bedb674b6381/1502481057
079/Program+Agenda+-+2017+NSF+Summit.pdf  
3 ​https://trustedci.org/2017-nsf-cfp/​; see also Appendix C. 
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well as experts from outside the community to give presentations and participate in panels.  
The CFP continued a process started in 2014, designed to elicit a greater degree of community 
participation in developing the agenda, executing the summit, and increasing our ability to 
identify summit findings that represent the concerns, successes, and aspirations of our 
community. The 2014 CFP process was expanded in 2015, and a “Tips for Building CFP 
Responses” was provided to guide and encourage respondents and additional content formats 
were considered. The 2017 CFP process proved a success, and drove a great deal of the 
resultant program, including a mix of 15 plenary submissions, 5 table talks, 11 training sessions, 
including a full day workshop as well as a keynotes from the community at large, and 
presentations from key leaders from within the NSF community. For the third year in the row, 
we received a marked increase in CPF proposals, again exceeding our capacity to 
accommodate.  
The Summit program spanned two and a half days from August 15 through 17. On August 15th, 
we offered a full day of training. Descriptions of each training session are appended as 
Appendix D.  On August 17th and 18th, the Summit followed a plenary format with talks invited 4
by the program committee and accepted from the CFP responses.​ ​Dr. Irene Qualters, Division 
Director of NSF/OAC welcomed the attendees and Jeff Spies, co-founder and Chief Technology 
Officer of the Center for Open Science (COS) gave an invited keynote. The program of 
submitted talks then commenced with talks on the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, and 
lessons learned at Minnesota Supercomputing Institute, Cornell, HTCondor. Two panel talks 
covering the topics of Cybersecurity threats and diversity and inclusiveness in the Cybersecurity 
workforce were also presented. The first day then concluded with talks on the topic of 
alternatives to NIST’s and security first principles. 
Day two opened with an invited keynote from Marjory Blumenthal, senior policy analyst and 
director of RAND's Science, Technology, and Policy Program. Her keynote discussed the impact 
of big data & privacy. Presentations then continued with a panel on cloud security supported by 
representatives from some of the biggest in the market today and a sharing the lessons learned 
of the Internet 2 NOC risk assessment. 
 
7 Participants 
This year registration was open to all interested individuals, a change we first made in 2016. 
This was done to avoid being insular, maintain and develop new relationships, and encourage 
4 ​See also, ​https://trustedci.org/2017training/ 
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infusion of additional perspectives. Registration was granted to all parties who requested 
attend and were able to demonstrate a connection to the community. As with prior summits, 
registration was free, and, as in previous years, invitations were sent to a predetermined list of 
individuals. Our invitation list was based on the invitation list from the 2016 summit, and was 
updated to account for changes in the community, suggestions from NSF staff, and speakers to 
address specific topics of the summit. The invitation list included those with direct 
cybersecurity responsibilities in NSF Large Facilities and CI projects, NSF project principal 
investigators, and other key stakeholders and risk owners to ensure that NSF cybersecurity 
evolves to address their needs. Interest in the 2016 summit was so strong we hit our 
registration limit much earlier than any previous year.  
 
Fig. 1 NSF Summit Attendees 
 
One hundred forty seven (147) individuals requested registration for the summit, 141 
registered, and record 123 attended (including speakers, tutorial presenters, panelists, students 
and the program committee). A listing of the attendees and their affiliations is in Appendix E. 
Eighty three attendees participated in the August 15 training sessions. Forty five individuals - 
over a third of participants - participated in planning, spoke, provided training, co-authored a 
CFP submission, and/or led a lunch table talk. Six attendees were students. Twenty nine 
attendees work at Large Facilities. Nine attendees work at the NSF.  
This year we were excited to welcome WISE who held full day workshop at the summit . WISE 5
includes representative from many European E-Infrastructures including SURF, Hikhef, ​GÉANT​, 
EGI, CERN, PRACE and EUDAT. The workshop featured US and International security experts 
collaborating on a variety of topics including the pDNS Data Sharing project, the impact of IoT 
devices on security, SoftWare Assurance and Risk Management. 
5 https://wise-community.org/2017/08/16/wise-feedback-gathered-at-the-nsf-summit/ 
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 7.1 NSF Project Representation 
Attendees were asked to provide the NSF project or other organization (NSF directorate in the 
case of NSF staff) with which they were associated including the NSF award number if 
applicable and their NSF Directorate. The following list contains a normalization of the provided 
answers. We count 57 projects including 18 large facilities(marked with “♦”), were represented 
at the summit by representatives of those projects. Additionally, eight more Large Facilities 
were represented by NSF program officers (marked with “♦*”). NSF directorates represented by 
program officers only are marked with “*”. NSF directorates represented in some manner 
include: OAC, GEO/OCE, CSE/CNS, MPS/APS, MPS/PHY, MPS/AST, MPS/DMR , ENG/CMMI, 
EHR/DGE, GEO/ICER, GEO/EAR and CCF. 
We note some answers given represent NSF projects (e.g. “CC*IIE”) or other general areas of 
the NSF community (e.g. “Science Gateways”) which are not very precise and we will work on 
obtaining more precise specification of awards in future summits to improve our understanding 
of community representation. 
● Academic Research Fleet (ARF) ♦* 
● The Agave Platform: An Open Science-As-A-Service Cloud Platform for Reproducible 
Science 
● A Single-Site I/UCRC Center for Research in Storage Systems (CRSS) 
● Northeast Tier 2 Center (NET2) (Part of ATLAS) 
● Atacama Large Millimeter Array (ALMA) ♦ 
● Blue Waters 
● CC*DNI DIBBs: Data Analysis and Management Building Blocks for Multi-Campus 
Cyberinfrastructure through Cloud Federation * 
● Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC) * 
● CC-NIE Integration: Leveraging DYNES for Weather Data Distribution on Multicast Virtual 
Circuits (NSF #1340910) 
● Collaborative Research: CICI: Regional: SouthEast SciEntific Cybersecurity for University 
Research (SouthEast SECURE) * 
● CICI: Data Provenance: Collaborative Research: Provenance Assurance Using Currency 
Primitives * 
● Collaborative Research: CICI: Secure and Resilient Architecture: Data Integrity Assurance 
and Privacy Protection Solutions for Secure Interoperability of Cloud Resources * 
● Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) detector at CERN ♦* 
● CyberCorps: Scholarship for Service Advanced Technological Centers Secure and 
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Trustworthy Computing 
● DataONE (Data Observation Network for Earth) * 
● Daniel K. Inouye Solar Telescope (DKIST) 
● Developing a Software Artifact Repository for Software Assurance Education​ (​NSF 
#1522847) * 
● EAGER:Cybermanufacturing:Collaborative Research: A novel process data analytics 
framework for IoT-enabled cybermanufacturing  
● EarthCube * 
● Enabling Cybersecurity Research Transition To Practice Acceleration * 
● Extreme Science and Engineering Discovery Environment (XSEDE) 
● Gateways to Discovery: Cyberinfrastructure for the Long Tail of Science 
● GEMINI observatory ♦ 
● HTCondor * 
● IceCube ♦ 
● International Ocean Discovery Program (IODP) ♦* 
● iPlant Collaborative 
● Japan-US Network Opportunity (JUNO) 
● Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) ♦ 
● Large Synoptic Survey Telescope (LSST) ♦* 
● MIR-Advanced Modular Incoherent Scatter Radar (AMISR) 
● National High Magnetic Field Laboratory (NHMFL) ♦ 
● National Optical Astronomy Observatory (NOAO) ♦ 
● National Optical Astronomy Observatory (CTIO) 
● National Radio Astronomy Observatory (NRAO) ♦ 
● National Solar Observatory (NSO) ♦ 
● National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) ♦ 
● National Institutes of Health 
● Natural Hazards Engineering Research Infrastructure (NHERI) ♦ 
● North East Storage Exchange (NESE) projectnese.org * 
● NSF SFS Project (PI): Tennessee Cybercorps: A Hybrid Program In Cybersecurity * 
● SF SFS Project (Lead PI): CyberWorkshops: Resources and Strategies for Teaching 
Cybersecurity in Computer Science (CReST) * 
● NSF SFS Project (Lead PI): Capacity Building in Cybersecurity: Broadening Participation of 
Women In Cybersecurity through Women in Cybersecurity Conference & Professional 
Development * 
● NSF TUES Type-I Project (PI): SecKnitKit (Security Knitting Kit): Integrating Security into 
Traditional Computer Science Courses * 
● Ocean Observatories Initiative (OOI) ♦ * 
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● Open Science Grid (OSG) 
● Regional Class Research Vessel Program ♦ 
● Science Gateways Community Institute 
● Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace * 
● Seismological Facilities for the Advancement of Geoscience and EarthScope (SAGE) 
● SHF: Small: Collaborative Research: Coupling Computation and Communication in 
FPGA-Enhanced Clouds and Clusters; 
● SHF: Medium: Collaborative Research: Next-Generation Message Passing for Parallel 
Programming: Resiliency, Time-to-Solution, Performance-Portability, Scalability, and 
QoS 
● SI2-SSE AttackTagger 
● US-Ignite 
● Very Large Array (VLA) ♦ 
● Wall of Wind (Florida International University) ♦ 
● WISE 
Participation from NSF program officers at the Cybersecurity Summit continued to drop lower 
this year with 9 NSF staff attending. This is down from 12 in 2016 and 18 in 2015. The NSF was 
in the process of moving from Arlington to Alexandria in the weeks before and after the 
summit. We realize this move likely had a negative impact attendance. 
 
7.2 Student Representation 
In addition to professionals, the Summit supported the participation of six students. Students 
were encouraged to self-nominate to the program, but were also able to be nominated by a 
mentor or teacher. In order to be further 
considered, they were then asked to provide 
a one-page, 800-word maximum letter 
describing the student’s interest in and any 
relevant experience with cybersecurity, 
emphasizing the benefit to the student 
and/or community of the student’s 
attendance at the Cybersecurity Summit.  
The Program Committee reviewed all 
submissions with an interest in advancing 
diversity and inclusiveness, settling on the 
following exceptional six students: 
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Dominique Dalanni – (George Washington University), William Drake (Indiana University 
Bloomington), Nikita Golubets (Eastern Michigan), Sinjoni Mukhopadhyay (University of 
California, Santa Cruz, Imani Palmer (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Rachael Shima 
(California State Polytechnic University). 
The selected student applicants were paired with mentors from the program committee and 
community to encourage their continued participation in cybersecurity and NSF 
cyberinfrastructure. Students and mentors were given one another’s contact information prior 
to the summit and encouraged, but not required, to contact one another. However, each pair 
did communicate prior to the summit, allowing them to familiarize themselves with one 
another prior to meeting in person. Once at the summit, students and mentors met each day 
for breakfast and lunch, along with one night for the program committee dinner. These 
meet-ups allowed the students to ask any questions they may have and assist in networking, 
while allowing mentors to introduce and share the community with potential new members.  
This program has shown success, and we have received positive feedback from both students 
and mentors.  
 
7.3 Inclusiveness  
Finding 4 from the 2013 summit stated “Future program committees should take on gender, 
age, and racial/ethnic diversity in the community and summit attendance as a strategic 
imperative for future summits.” The organizers recognize that diverse participation is both a 
socially relevant outcome for NSF  and a particular challenge in the cybersecurity community in 6
general . Thus, in 2014, we expressly addressed the topic with the PC, identifying two members 7
to spearhead efforts (Baylis, Hassler), and the group sought to encourage diverse participation 
via the invitees, speakers, panelists, and PC itself. Additionally, the CFP expressly gave priority 
to those students from groups underrepresented in the NSF information security workforce. 
We note that Baylis has specific experience in this area as chair of the Supercomputing Broader 
Engagement in 2008 and participated in that committee in 2009. Baylis and Hassler again 
spearheaded these efforts in 2017, building on the success seen in 2014, 2015 and 2016.  
In order to gather ongoing baseline data related to this diversity effort, 2017 registrants had the 
6 ​See​, NSF GPG, Section II.C.2.d.i 
7 ​See, e.g.​, ​Agents of Change: Women in the Information Security Profession.​ A whitepaper derived from the 2013 
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option to provide their ethnicity/race and gender/sex. There was a 4% increase in the number 
of female registrants in 2017, and only slight changes in the ethnicity/race of registrants, with 
an increase in diverse participants. The aggregated responses to the those items follow. 
Voluntary responses to these questions show: 
Table 1. Attendee self-reported ethnicity. 
Ethnicity / Race  
Asian or Southeast Asian 11 (8.4%) 
Black or African American 4 (3.1%) 
Hispanic or Latino 4 (3.1%) 
Native Alaskan or American Indian 1 (0.8%) 
Multiracial 4 (3.1%) 
White or Caucasian 79 (60.8%) 
Other Ethnicity 0 (0%) 
Other (space provided) 1 (0.8%) 
Prefer not to answer 10 (7.7%) 
No Answer Provided 16 (12.3%) 
 
Table 2. Attendee self-reported gender. 
Gender / Sex  
Female 27 (20.8%) 
Male 77 (59.2%) 
No Answer Provided 26 (20.0%) 
 
8 Attendee Evaluations 
We sought attendee evaluations of the summit via two SurveyMonkey surveys. One survey 
gathered feedback on the summit generally; the other requested feedback specific to the 
August 15 training sessions. A summary of the general and training survey results are appended 
to this report as​ Appendix H​.  
8.1 Attendee Survey 
The responses were generally very positive and extremely thoughtful. Forty-five attendees 
(approximately 37% of all attendees) responded to the general “Attendee Survey.” The 
organizers did not submit responses, but the survey was open to all other participants. We did 
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not request the names of respondents, and have redacted some information from the 
appended report to further protect the anonymity of respondents.  
The quantified and categorical results (e.g., rating scales, yes/no questions) were very 
favorable. Selections follow:  
● To Question #5, “How would you rate your overall experience with the 2017 summit?” 
33% of respondents selected “Good”, while the remaining 66% responded with 
“Excellent.” 
● Regarding Question #7, “Was this summit better than what you expected, worse than 
what you expected, or about what you expected?” the summit at least met the 
expectations of everyone that responded, while exceeding the expectations of 86% of 
respondents.  
● To Question #8, “How useful to your work was the information discussed at the 
summit?” 100% of respondents gave ratings of “moderately useful,” “very useful,” or 
“extremely useful,” with 86% providing the higher two responses. 
● To Question #9, “If you attended last year’s summit, how does this year’s compare?” 
38% of respondents gave ratings of “this year’s summit was about the same as last 
year’s,” “this year’s summit was better than last year’s,” or “this year’s summit was 
much better than last year’s,” with 28% providing the higher two responses. The 
remaining 62% of respondents indicated that they did not attend last year’s summit.  
● To Question #11, “Would you like to attend future summits?” 80% responded “Yes,” 
while the other 20% responded “Maybe.”  
Questions 13 and 14 sought open-ended responses, and were designed to elicit critique and 
discern highly-valued aspects of the experience. While the generally positive results of the 
above-referenced questions provide context, these open-ended questions have proved a useful 
communication tool. Observations follow: 
● Question 13 asked, “How can we improve the summit experience in the future?” 
○ Of the 22 respondents to this question, 10 remarked on the training sessions, 
most suggesting that information from the training sessions should be further 
broadcast to reach extended audiences, e.g.: 
“As I've stated before that given the effort the instructors put into the 
training sessions, it would be very nice to record these and make them 
available for later viewing. At the federated management course I took 
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offered by Scott Koranda and Jim Basney, there were only a few people, and 
the quality of the course was very good and in the ideal world would be 
shared by a LOT more people... I suggest that starting "low-key" with 
recording the training sessions would work quite well - perhaps create a 
tradition of using students who now record notes at the lunch session 
reunions, to now also take charge of recording the training sessions. I think it 
is NOT NECESSARY at least at the beginning to buy a bunch of expensive 
equipment or hire specialists for this - it’s amazing how good a quality you 
can get with a simple iPhone and a selfie stick - just check YouTube - some of 
the videos done this simply are amazingly good. Over time, it could become a 
tradition and I'll bet the high quality of the results will surprise.” 
○ While 6 of the respondents commented on desires for future panels and talks. 
An example response follows: 
“Expand the training - perhaps 2 days? And bring back those guys from 
Microsoft, AWS and Google - that panel could have gone on for a couple 
more hours easily.” 
● Question 14 asked, “Were there any aspects of the summit you found particularly useful 
or important? If so, please explain.” 
○ Of the 21 respondents, 10 praised both the plenary discussions and talks that 
covered implementing security controls (e.g., FISMA, NIST 800-53), especially 
citing the input from the corporate representatives present. An example 
response follows: 
“The diversity panel and the "cloud" panel (Azure, Google and AWS) were 
outstanding. I urge you to continue to have at least one "privacy" session in 
the program. Loved the diversity of the speakers, both in the mix of "people" 
but also the topics and subjects.” 
8.2 Training Evaluation 
The Training Day preceding this year’s summit offered eight training sessions: 2 all day sessions, 
and 8 half day sessions. Each session was well attended, with topics and number of attendees 
as follows: WISC Workshop (14); Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations 
(8); Legacy Industrial Control System, Secure / Replace / Ignore? AM (4); Handling Regulated 
Government Data, Protected Health Information, and CUI AM (15); Security Log Analysis AM 
(15); Digital Forensics / Incident Response AM (6); Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF 
Projects PM (18); Shared Intelligence Platform for Protecting our National Cyberinfrastructure 
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PM (7); Rebuilding a Plane in Flight: Refactors Under Pressure PM (5); and Automated 
Assessment Tools - Theory & Practice PM (5). Each tutorial attendee was asked to fill out a 
tutorial-specific survey after each training session concluded. 
The responses to the tutorial-specific surveys were very positive generally, and included 
constructive feedback, as well as ideas for future training offerings. For simplicity, we asked 
attendees to complete one survey with several repeated questions to allow sorting 
differentiated responses for morning and afternoon sessions. The aggregated ratings in 
Questions 1 through 10, and 13 through 18 are attached as ​Appendix H​. We summarize a few 
aggregate responses below: 
● To Question 3, “Based on your overall experience with the August 15 training sessions, 
would you participate in training offered at future summits?,” 10 of 11 respondents 
selected “Yes,” the last selected “Maybe.” 
● To Questions 7 and 15, “How would you rate your overall experience with the 
[morning/afternoon] training?,” 90% of responses were “Excellent” or “Good.” 
● To Questions 9 and 17, “Was this [morning/afternoon] training better than what you 
expected, worse than what you expected, or about what you expected?,” 100% of 
responses indicated that expectations were met or exceeded. Sixteen (76%) of 
responses were “Somewhat better,” “Quite a bit better” or “A great deal better.”  
● To Questions 10 and 18, “How useful to your work was this [morning/afternoon] 
training?,” 71% of the responses (15 of 21) were “Very Useful” or “Extremely Useful.” 
The responses for the individual tutorials were reported back to their respective tutorial 
leaders, including responses to Questions 11 and 19, “How can we improve this training session 
in the future?” and Questions 12 and 20, “Were there any aspects of [morning/afternoon] 
training you found particularly useful or important? Please explain.” 
 
9 Lessons Learned 
As noted in Section 4.3 “Future Challenges” of this report, there is great value and need for the 
NSF CI community to share experiences and lessons learned within the community in an effort 
to strengthen preparedness and overall cybersecurity for NSF projects. In this section we 
document noteworthy observations of “lessons learned” during the 2017 Cybersecurity 
Summit. 
In Todd Tannenbaum’s talk "Concerns and questions that should keep software creators awake 
at night" he points out that when a security bug is found in software, always search for more 
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instances of the same problem. The reusability of code can result in propagating security flaws. 
Evan F. Bolling from the Minnesota Supercomputing Institute (MSI) shared a number of 
experiences in this talk “From Bare Metal to Virtual: Lessons Learned when a Supercomputing 
Institute Deploys its First Cloud”. Evan noted that it’s easy to point fingers at others rather than 
taking ownership of an issue. Staff culture can be resistant to change and new responsibilities. 
Taking ownership and communication are key to changing staff culture. Dispelling the risks to 
staff, and clearly stating that these new roles won’t cost them their job, result in personal 
financial liability, or lead to prison time can help ease their concerns. He also suggested 
emphasizing new responsibilities as professional development for staff and/or co-authorship in 
research papers to advance their careers. He also pointed out that Openstack is a hot skill set in 
the current market, making those with experience more attractive to employers. Finally MSI 
found that the NIH Genomic Data Sharing (GDS) Policy policy is lax, but that the dbGaP best 
practices policy is a good checklist that can be expanded later. 
During the Cloud Security panel it was highlighted that standards must evolve over time to 
adjust to the changing environment, and in some cases to correct past guidance. For example in 
August of 2017 NIST revised special publication 800-63-3 “Digital Identity Guideline”  8
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-63ver1.0.1.pdf> 
relaxing password complexity requirements and increasing password lengths. The password 
expiration guideline was removed completely and the new guideline directs that passwords 
should only change if it has been stolen, exposed, or hacked. 
 
10 Conclusion 
We were pleased with the introduction of the theme ​“Ensuring Data Provenance, Integrity and 
Resilience”​ and the impact it generated for this year’s summit. We believe the theme provided 
a strong motivating force that tied together the keynotes and presentations and helped focus 
the community into sharing experiences on a particular topic that we and the community 
deemed relevant. Moreover, it is encouraging that the community participants and response to 
call for proposals increased for the third straight year. To this end, we thank the community 
members who helped the summit achieve its goals. In particular, we thank those who served on 
the program committee for their effort and devotion to the summit. 
We are excited for next year’s summit and for the opportunity to confront new cybersecurity 
challenges in our unique and collaborative environment. This will require, however, that we, 
8https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-3.pdf 
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the program committee, and the community continue to be vigilant in identifying new and 
relevant areas for discussion at next year’s summit. And as always, we will continue to evolve 
and improve upon the summit to adapt to the community’s changing needs, e.g., adjusting our 
registration model to expand participation by the NSF and broader communities. 














Appendix A:  Recommendations for Past Summits 
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This appendix serves as a compendium for all recommendations made in past summit reports. 
The exact role of these “recommendations” has shifted over time, with some recommendations 
being directly carried over from year-to-year, while others were rebranded as “Opportunities,” 
and others may be tweaked or responded to. Despite this changing usage, this appendix should 
provide a comprehensive perspective of the takeaways from past summits, and should serve to 
inform recommendations made in this and future summit reports. 
 
2016 Recommendations: 
Note: the 2016 Summit Report carried over the Recommendations from the 2015 Report. 
Recommendation 1:​​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should develop a broadly 
applicable strategy for information security budgets, including how, why, and where it does 
what it does in terms of spending. 
Recommendation 2​:​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should support research on 
metrics that indicate whether spending on information security is sufficient and appropriately 
balanced with a project’s science mission. 
Recommendation 3​​: The NSF CI and Large Facility community should develop a common 
understanding among all stakeholders of how accountability, risk responsibility, and risk 
acceptance practices are most efficiently and appropriately distributed among project 
leadership, project personnel, and other stakeholders. 
Recommendation 4:​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should determine its software 
assurance, quality, and supply chain requirements. 
Recommendation 5​:​ ​Utilizing a consensus process that includes all stakeholders, the NSF CI and 
Large Facility community should adopt a common, broadly applicable framework for 
information security. 
Recommendation 6:​ ​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should continue to implement, 
refine, and evaluate risk-based approaches to cybersecurity that leverage established best 
practices as much as possible, while also addressing the community’s particular needs around 
unique scientific instruments, data, openness, multi-organizational relationships, mission 
assurance, resilience, and project lifespans.  
Recommendation 7:​ ​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should find more ongoing ways 
of collaboratively developing and maintaining cybersecurity programs, such as sharing 
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materials, services, practices, lessons learned, and collaborative/peer reviews.  
Recommendation 8:​​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should continue to develop and 
disseminate best practices for identity and access management to support research.  
Opportunity 1:​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should explore how it can 12 support, 
participate in, and directly benefit from basic and applied cybersecurity research like that 
funded via NSF’s Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC) and Risk and Resilience 
solicitations. 
Opportunity 2:​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should closely follow, 13 participate in, 
evaluate, and validate the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence’s community threat model 
development effort, including determining whether insights into threat actors and threat 
events positively impact the efficiency and effectiveness of our cybersecurity programs and risk 
management processes.  
Opportunity 3:​​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should explore collaboration 14 with, 
and even drive change in, existing cross-organizational mechanisms (e.g., REN-ISAC, EDUCAUSE, 
Internet2) where information sharing can efficiently and effectively help the community gain a 
defensive advantage. 
Opportunity 4:​​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should determine when and 15 how 
privacy intersects with NSF CI cybersecurity efforts in terms of (i) legal and regulatory 
requirements; (ii) our community’s norms, values, and stakeholder relationships; and (iii) being 
a barrier to and/or enabler of science  
 
2015 Recommendations: 
Recommendation 1:​ ​​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should develop a broadly 
applicable strategy for information security budgets, including how, why, and where it does 
what it does in terms of spending 
Recommendation 2:​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should support research on 
metrics that indicate whether spending on information security is sufficient and appropriately 
balanced with a project’s science mission. 
Recommendation 3​:​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should develop a common 
understanding among all stakeholders of how accountability, risk responsibility, and risk Report 
of the 2015 NSF Cybersecurity Summit for Large Facilities and Cyberinfrastructure 16 
acceptance practices are most efficiently and appropriately distributed among project 
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leadership, project personnel, and other stakeholders. 
Recommendation 4:​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should determine its software 
assurance, quality, and supply chain requirements. 
Recommendation 5​:​ ​Utilizing a consensus process that includes all stakeholders, the NSF CI and 
Large Facility community should adopt a common, broadly applicable framework for 
information security. 
Recommendation 6:​ ​​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should continue to implement, 
refine, and evaluate risk-based approaches to cybersecurity that leverage established best 
practices as much as possible, while also addressing the community’s particular needs around 
unique scientific instruments, data, openness, multi-organizational relationships, mission 
assurance, resilience, and project lifespans 
Recommendation 7:​ ​​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should find more ongoing ways 
of collaboratively developing and maintaining cybersecurity programs, such as sharing 
materials, services, practices, lessons learned, and collaborative/peer reviews. 
Recommendation 8:​​​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should continue to develop and 
disseminate best practices for identity and access management to support research. 
Recommendation 9:​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should determine when and how 
privacy intersects with NSF CI cybersecurity efforts in terms of (i) legal and regulatory 
requirements; (ii) our community’s norms, values, and stakeholder relationships; and (iii) being 
a barrier to and/or enabler of science.  
Recommendation 10:​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should explore how it can 
support, participate in, and directly benefit from basic and applied cybersecurity research like 
that funded via NSF’s Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC) and Risk and Resilience 
solicitations. 
Recommendation 11:​ ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should closely follow, 
participate in, evaluate, and validate the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence’s community 
threat model development effort, including determining whether insights into threat actors and 
threat events positively impact the efficiency and effectiveness of our cybersecurity programs 
and risk management processes. 
Recommendation 12​:​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should explore collaboration 
with, and even drive change in, existing cross-organizational mechanisms (e.g., REN-ISAC, 
EDUCAUSE, Internet2) where information sharing can efficiently and effectively help the 
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community gain a defensive advantage.  
 
2014 Recommendations: 
Recommendation 1:​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should define its own best 
practices for cybersecurity rather than anticipating detailed direction from NSF. Clearly setting 
our own standards will help protect us from compliance directives not as well-suited to our 
community. 
Recommendation 2​: The NSF CI and Large Facility community should implement a risk-based 
approach to cybersecurity that leverages broader best practices as much as possible, while 
addressing and balancing the community’s particular needs around unique scientific 
instruments, data, openness, multi-organizational relationships, and project lifespans.  
Recommendation 3: ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should identify and share best 
practices for how to successfully integrate security throughout and across project 
organizations. 
Recommendation 4:​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should develop a common 
understanding of how risk responsibility and acceptance practices are most efficiently and 
appropriately distributed among project personnel and stakeholders.  
Recommendation 5:​ The NSF CI and Large Facility community should explore ways of 
collaboratively developing and maintaining cybersecurity programs, such as sharing materials, 
services, policies, practices, lessons learned, and collaborative/peer reviews.  
Recommendation 6: ​The NSF CI and Large Facility community should continue to find ways of 
sharing real-time data in order to foster continuity of expertise and gain as much of an 
advantage as possible in defending ourselves. Existing cross-organizational mechanisms (e.g., 
REN-ISAC, EDUCAUSE, Internet2) should be evaluated in terms of how they could be leveraged.  
Recommendation 7:​ We recommend the NSF CI and Large Facility community undertake or 
support a research effort to increase understanding and communicate that knowledge or 
know-how for each of the following open questions:  
D. What is the threat profile for our community, and can insights into threat actors and 
their motivations positively impact the efficiency and effectiveness of our cybersecurity 
programs and risk management processes?  
E. When and how does privacy intersect with NSF CI cybersecurity efforts in terms of (i) 
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legal and regulatory requirements; (ii) our community’s norms, values, and stakeholder 
relationships; and (iii) being a barrier to and/or enabler of science?  
F. How do we include and meaningfully address software assurance, quality, or supply 
chain in the context of the project cybersecurity programs, and the summit itself?  
 
2013 Recommendations: 
(Recommendation) 1:​ The community should identify a means to organize future summits. 
(Recommendation) 2:​ Future summits should continue to include NSF project principal 
investigators, other key stakeholders and risk owners to ensure that NSF cybersecurity evolves 
to address their needs.  
(Recommendation) 3: ​Future program committees should consider more time and 
opportunities (e.g., increased seating) for tutorials, hands-on activities, and organized 
discussion. 
(Recommendation) 4: ​Future program committees should take on gender, age, and 
racial/ethnic diversity in the community and the summit attendance as a strategic imperative 
for future summits. 
(Recommendation) 5:​ The community should consider the relationship between large facilities 
and smaller cyberinfrastructure projects, and their potential synergies around cybersecurity, as 
well as how (and if) the summit can effectively address both. 
(Recommendation) 6:​ The community needs to develop a better understanding of the 
expectations for their cybersecurity programs and how to meet those expectations. 
  
 









Appendix B: Call For Participation  
 
Report of the 2017 NSF Cybersecurity Summit for Large Facilities and Cyberinfrastructure 38 
 
 Call for Participation 
2017 NSF Cybersecurity Summit for Large Facilities and 
Cyberinfrastructure 
August 15-17 * Westin Arlington Gateway * Arlington, VA 
Theme:​ ​Ensuring Data Provenance, Integrity and Resilience 
It is our great pleasure to announce that the 2017 Summit will take place Tuesday, August 15th 
through Thursday, August 17th, at the Westin Arlington Gateway near the National Science 
Foundation Headquarters in Arlington, VA. On August 15th, the Summit will offer a full day of 
information security training tailored for the NSF community. The second and third days will 
follow a workshop format designed to increase the NSF community’s understanding of 
cybersecurity strategies that strengthen trustworthy science: what data, processes, and 
systems are crucial to the scientific mission, what risks they face, and how to protect them. 
About the Summit 
Since 2004, the annual NSF Cybersecurity Summit has served as a valuable part of the process 
of securing the NSF scientific cyberinfrastructure by providing the community a forum for 
education, sharing experiences, building relationships, and establishing best practices. 
The NSF cyberinfrastructure ecosystem presents an aggregate of complex cybersecurity needs 
(e.g., scientific data and instruments, unique computational and storage resources, complex 
collaborations) as compared to other organizations and sectors. This community has a unique 
opportunity to develop information security practices tailored to these needs, as well as break 
new ground on efficient, effective ways to protect information assets while supporting science. 
The Summit will bring together leaders in NSF cyberinfrastructure and cybersecurity to continue 
the processes initiated in 2013-2016: Building a trusting, collaborative community, and 
seriously addressing that community’s core cybersecurity challenges. 
The Summit seeks proposals for presentations, breakout and training sessions. It offers 
opportunities for student scholarships. 
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Proposing Content for the Summit 
There are many ways to contribute to the Cybersecurity Summit.  We are open to proposals for 
full- or half-day training sessions, for plenary presentations, and for breakout sessions.  More 
specific information on each of those is available below.  Submissions should be sent to 
CFP@trustedci.org​ by June 5th.  Responses should go out by June 26th to ensure adequate 
planning time for presenters. 
  
Proposing a Plenary Presentation 
Please submit brief white papers focused on NSF Large Facilities’ unmet cybersecurity 
challenges, lessons learned, and/or significant successes for presentation during the Summit 
Plenary Session (Aug 16-17).  White papers (and presentations) may be in the form of position 
papers and/or narratives and may be one to five pages in length. 
All submitted white papers will be included in the 2017 summit report. The Program Committee 
will select the most relevant, reasoned, and broadly interesting for presentation. A limited 
amount of funding is available to assist with travel for accepted submissions. 
Submission deadline:​ June 5th 
Submit to:​ CFP@trustedci.org 
Word limit:​  400 to 2000 words (~1-5 single spaced pages) 
Notification of acceptance:​ June 26th 
  
Proposing a Training Session 
Training may be targeted at technical and/or management audiences, and be half-day or 
full-day in length.  Areas of interest include, but are not limited to: cybersecurity planning and 
programs, risk assessment and management, regulatory compliance, identity and access 
management, data management and provenance, networks security and monitoring, secure 
coding and software assurance, physical security in the context of information security, and 
information security of scientific and emerging technologies. The Program Committee will 
select the most community-relevant and broadly interesting training sessions for presentation 
during the first day of the summit (Aug 15). 
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We generally prefer  training sessions  with some hands-on or interactive component over 
those that can be equally well presented in a non-interactive format (e.g. online videos), 
whether that component is a series of review Q&As, the opportunity to work directly with a 
piece of software or other tool, or a planning/management activity. 
Submission deadline:​ June 5th 
Submit to: ​CFP@trustedci.org 
Word Limit: ​ 600 words 
Notification of Acceptance:​  June 26th 
  
Proposing Table Top Sessions 
In past years, the Summit has experimented with other formats for networking and information 
exchange, such as table-top topics at lunch.  Proposals for such an activity should be 1-2 pages 
in length and include who would run the activity, the activity’s intended audience, and a 
description of the activity itself and its expected benefits. 
Submission deadline:​  June 5th 
Submit to:​ CFP@trustedci.org 
Word limit: ​ 400 to 800 words (~1-2 single spaced pages) 
Notification of acceptance: ​ June 26th 
  
Information for Students 
Each year, the summit organizers invite several students to attend the summit.  Reimbursement 




Notes for First-Time Presenters 
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The Summit organizers want to encourage those who have not presented at previous Summits 
to share their experiences, expertise, and insights with the NSF cybersecurity community.  You 
don’t need to be perfectly polished, you just need to have something to share about your 
project or facility's experience with information security.  Feedback from last year’s Summit 
showed that there was a great deal of interest in “lessons learned” type presentations from 
projects who’ve faced cybersecurity challenges, and had to rethink some things afterwards. 
We’ve put together a page of tips and ideas for new presenters, including proposal and 
presentation tips as well as suggested topics.  More direct coaching is available upon request. 
Please contact ​CFP@trustedci.org​ with any questions, or to request help preparing a proposal 
or getting it ready to present at the Summit. 
  
So you want to present at the 2017 NSF Cybersecurity Summit… 
Welcome!  The Summit organizers wish to encourage and support participation from 
throughout the wider NSF community.  To further that mission, we’ve provided some 
information (below) to aid in the preparation of CFP responses.  Please don’t hesitate to direct 
questions to ​CFP@trustedci.org​. 
  
What to Present 
This year’s theme is “Ensuring Data Provenance, Integrity and Resilience.”  This is a subject that 
is the underlying motivation for all of the cybersecurity activities we pursue.  The organizers 
especially appreciate proposals that drive this home, however, not every presentation, training 
session, or activity has to be centered around just that topic.  Please submit any idea that you 
think may be relevant to our audience.  If you would like to present, but aren’t sure of what 
topic to choose, consider the following suggestions: 
● Lessons Learned: Get beyond the brag session.  Tell the audience about something that 
DIDN’T go well for your project’s cybersecurity efforts and how you overcame it.  Even if 
you haven’t overcome it yet, share the questions you are struggling with and  open 
things up to the audience for Q&A or brainstorming.  Too often, those doing 
cybersecurity in our community only see the big successes that others do press releases 
about, but there is even more to learn about the things that don’t work. 
● Tools: Have you discovered a new or unusual tool  or technique that enables you in 
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cybersecurity work?  Do a “getting started” tutorial to help others learn about it so that 
they can implement it for themselves. 
● Enabling Cybersecurity Professional Development: What do you do to find, train, and 
retain good people?  How do you enable them to keep their skills fresh and growing? 
● It would be great to get a session on approaches to building the cybersecurity workforce 
available to the science community.  
We strongly encourage proposals that address the 2016 Summit finding and recommendations: 
● Information Security Budgets 
● Accountability, Risk Acceptance, and the Role of Project Leadership 
● Software assurance 
More details on the recommendations can be found in the 2016 NSF summit report: 
https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/handle/2022/21161 
Additionally, the following ideas might help you build a presentation idea around this year’s 
theme, or work the theme into your presentation’s topic: 
● Supply chain requirements 
● What are your most valuable and/or sensitive data? 
○ What assets have you had the most trouble protecting? 
○ Where have you found the best resources?  For commodity technologies?  For 
your special equipment? 
● Have you gone through a process of formally identifying your information assets for 
security purposes?  What does the documentation look like?  What challenges have you 
faced (e.g., in classifying data)? 
● Did you find anything assets that surprised you…. that you didn’t think of as critical to 
the integrity of the scientific results? 
● How do you assign responsibility for / stewardship of specific information assets (or sets 
of assets that serve a process) within your organization?  When if ever does security 
have direct accountability for the security of these assets? 
  
How to Build a CFP Response 
The proposal you submit will be used in two ways: to tell the organizers about what you plan to 
present, and to be included in the summit findings as a sort of after-action report.  It should 
include: 
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● An executive summary (short description of the topic and content). 
● Who the presenter(s) is/are. 
● Either a whitepaper discussion of the topic, or a narrative you’d like to share with the 
community.  (For activities that are not trainings or plenary sessions, this may be 
replaced with a description of the planned activity, any space or equipment needs, and 
the activity’s intended audience.) 
● Contact information (preferably email) for the presenter(s) in case the organizers have 
any questions.  This can be in a separate note in the email body instead of the proposal 
itself if presenter(s) don’t wish it to be published. 
● Expected length of the session/training/activity.  Generally, trainings are either full- or 
half-day and plenary sessions are about 50 minutes, but if a good idea takes more time 
than that, we will work with presenters to make it happen. 
● Any relevant references (e.g. link to the home page for the project the talk is about, or 
recommendations for further reading). 
Our community has expressed in the past that many find it helpful if they can download a copy 
of a presentation’s slides.  If you are willing to publish your slides, please email a copy (or a link 
to where you prefer to host slides) to ​CFP@trustedci.org​. 
The easiest way to get help/feedback from the organizing committee prior to submitting your 
final proposal is to create a Google Doc containing your proposal and sending an edit link to 
CFP@trustedci.org​.  Don’t share directly with that address, as the link will be passed on to a 
reviewer who will have their own google account. 
  
Tips for Presenting 
There are many different presentation formats that can work well, depending on the topic. 
Consider the following: 
● Lecture format:​ The presenter(s) talk to the audience and show slides to support their 
dialogue, then do a short Q&A time at the end of the presentation. 
● Panel format:​ 3-5 persons answer questions offered by a moderator on a specific topic 
or set of topics, then do a short Q&A with the audience.  This tends to work out best 
when the panel contains people with very different backgrounds or viewpoints, and the 
moderator is good at keeping folks to the topic and time constraints. 
● Open Forum format:​ 2-3 persons answer questions offered by the audience.  Works 
best if there is an extra person gathering questions and presenting them, and if the 
speakers can keep things succinct so that the presentation keeps moving and many 
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questions get answered. 
● Hands-on format:​ The presenter(s) walk the audience through a demo or tutorial as the 
audience follows along on their computers (or on paper, if the topic supports it).  If you 
are doing a training that will have many hands-on activities, consider having more than 
one presenter, or a presenter plus a helper or two who can go around the room and 
help participants who get stuck, allowing the group as a whole to move on. 
Whatever format you choose, be sure to engage your audience by making eye contact (with 
them, not with the slide screen!), showing interest in what you are saying, and not rushing. 
Most speakers appear most smooth and practiced when following a general outline they’ve 
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Concurrent Morning Sessions 
 ​WISE Workshop (Full Day) 
Instructors: ​WISE Community 
The WISE (Wise Information Security for collaborating E-infrastructures) community was 
born as the result of a workshop in October 2015, which was jointly organized by the 
GÉANT group SIG-ISM (Special Interest Group on Information Security Management) 
and SCI, the ‘Security for Collaboration among Infrastructures’ group of staff from several 
large-scale distributed computing infrastructures. All agreed at the workshop that 
collaboration and trust is the key to successful information security in the world of 
federated digital infrastructures for research. WISE is an international community with 
participants spanning North America, Europe, Asia and Australasia. 
WISE provides a trusted global framework where security experts can share information 
on topics such as risk management, experiences about certification processes and threat 
intelligence. With participants from e-Infrastructures such as EGI, EUDAT, GEANT, 
PRACE, XSEDE, OSG, NRENs and more, WISE focuses on standards, guidelines and 
practices, and promotes the protection of critical infrastructure. To date WISE has created 
four working groups, each tackling different aspects of collaborative security and trust. 
The community is currently working on defining a comprehensive security training 
catalogue (STAA-WG), risk assessment template (RAW-WG), big data best practice 
guidelines (SBOD-WG) and guidance for assessing an infrastructure against the new 
version 2 of SCI, the framework established to ease cross-infrastructure information 
exchange during security incidents (SCIv2-WG). 
We invite security representatives from E-Infrastructures to participate. This includes 
operations security individuals and policy makers. 
Additional information can be found 
at: ​https://wiki.geant.org/display/WISE/WISE+@+NSF+Summit 
 
Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations 
Instructors: ​Jim Basney (NCSA and University of Illinois/CTSC) and Scott Koranda 
(Spherical Cow Group/CTSC) 
Research Organizations and Collaborations, and especially Virtual Organizations (VOs), 
come together to solve complex problems leveraging people and resources from multiple 
institutions, often spanning the world. Expert in their respective domains, VOs rarely have 
expertise in the identity management aspects of collaboration. Regardless of VO size, 
properly designed identity management processes and technologies can help facilitate 
VO research by providing access to collaboration tools and services quickly, and 
removing that access when it should no longer be granted. 
This full-day tutorial will provide an overview of the issues in identity management facing 
and solutions available to VOs, in order to help them more easily manage access to their 
resources. 
Topics covered will include: 
- Understanding the identity management process needs of VOs of any size 
- Leveraging Federated and Social Identity to authenticate VO participants 
- Understanding the complexities of international federation and collaboration 
- Passwords, Certificates, SSH Keys, and other authentication technologies: what works 
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where? 
- Participant lifecycle management using open source identity management solutions, 
including COmanage, Grouper, and Shibboleth 
- Application Integration and Provisioning, from the shell to the web to the cloud: how to 
make apps work with identity management infrastructure 
Interactive demonstrations will be used to provide tangible insight into the capabilities of 
various solutions. 
Note: A previous version of this training was given at the 2016 NSF Cybersecurity 
Summit. 
 
Security Log Analysis 
Instructor:​ Mark Krenz (Indiana University/CTSC) 
The goal of security log analysis is to more efficiently leverage log collection in order to 
identify threats and anomalies in their cyberinfrastructure. I will be presenting a half-day 
training that will help attendees tie various log and data sources together to provide a 
more rounded, coherent picture of a potential security event. It will also help attendees 
understand log analysis as a life cycle (Collection, Event Management, Analysis, 
Response) that continues to become more efficient over time. It will demonstrate how 
proper management of these four phases contributes to a security team’s effectiveness. 
Interactive demonstrations will cover both automated and manual analysis using multiple 
log sources (network protocols, files, software, intel, etc.), with examples from real 
security incidents. Lastly, the training will cover how to use lessons learned during each 
cycle to tune the monitoring and analysis workflow to improve an organization’s 
operational security footing over time. 
 
Legacy Industrial Control Systems - Secure / Replace / Ignore? 
Instructor: ​Phil Salkie (Jenariah Industrial Automation) 
Scientific and technical facilities worldwide incorporate Programmable Logic Controllers 
(PLCs) and Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems into their mix of 
technologies - often without the knowledge or support of the on-site IT department. 
 These systems can include decades-old designs, contain firmware which is not (or 
cannot) be updated or patched, and can have long lists of known vulnerabilities - yet they 
continue to be placed into network environments throughout the world.  This breakout 
session will provide a framework for IT department management to inventory, evaluate, 
triage, and secure their existing controls systems, as well as supplying specification 
language for use when systems must be replaced with modern, security-aware hardware. 
 
 
Handling Regulated Government Data, Protected Health Information, and CUI 
Instructor: ​Anurag Shankar (Indiana University) 
With cyber threat at unprecedented levels, the May 11th presidential executive order on 
strengthening the cybersecurity of federal networks and critical infrastructure requires 
government agencies to examine unmet cybersecurity needs and take appropriate 
actions to protect the nation and the public at large.  Downstream effects are likely to 
follow for government subcontractors, especially R&D facilities and academia, already in 
a difficult position due to insufficient resources, regulatory expertise, and often the 
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presence of both government information subject to FISMA and “Controlled Unclassifed 
Information” (CUI), for instance HIPAA protected health information (PHI).  Each data type 
requires adherence to different standards – the NIST Risk Management Framework 
(RMF) and NIST 800-53 controls for FISMA, the recently released NIST SP 800-171 
controls for CUI, and HIPAA Security Rule safeguards for PHI.  This workshop is 
designed to untangle these different data types, regulations, and requirements, and to 
provide guidance on how to build and deploy an effective cyber risk mitigation strategy 
that enables one to handle compliance and bolster cybersecurity in the most 
cost-effective way. 
 
Digital Forensics / Incident Response 
Instructor:​ Warren Raquel (NCSA and University of Illinois/CTSC) 
Digital forensics can provide a deeper understanding of what happened during a 
Cybersecurity event than what standard incident response measures can provide. If you 
are considering adding digital forensics capabilities to your Cybersecurity program this 
program will walk through what you will need to do this. We will discuss how to start small 
and build up your capabilities. At the end of this program you should understand the pros 
and cons of a digital forensics program and how to get it off the ground. 
Computer incident response is a required capability for any project or activity that is 
running internet connected services. CTSC would present a half-day tutorial that will 
provide basic information on setting up an incident response program so that students 
can prepare their project team or organization for an incident investigation. The initial 
focus of the tutorial will be on identifying the processes, policies, information, and 
monitoring services that are required to effectively respond to a security incident. This first 
section will discuss investigation and analysis tools that might be useful for investigations. 
The second part of the tutorial will identify a series of questions the incident response 
team can use to guide them through both the investigation and the mitigation process. 
The participant should leave the session with an understanding of the basic steps needed 
to create an incident response program and what to do when an incident occurs. 
  
Concurrent Afternoon Sessions 
WISE Workshop (continued) 
See full description above. 
 
Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations (continued) 
See full description above. 
 
Shared Intelligence Platform for Protecting our National Cyberinfrastructure 
Instructor: ​Alex Withers (NCSA / University of Illinois) 
The SDAIA project seeks to advance the security infrastructure available for open science 
networks, aka Science DMZs. This research is expected to significantly enhance the 
security of campus and research networks. It addresses the emerging security challenge 
of open, unrestricted access to campus research networks, but beyond that it lays the 
foundation for an evolvable intelligence sharing network with the very real potential for 
national scale analysis of that intelligence. Further it will supply cyber security researchers 
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with a rich real-world intelligence source upon which to test their theories, tools, and 
techniques. The research will produce a new kind of virtual security appliance that will 
significantly enhance the security posture of open science networks so that advanced 
high-performance network-based research can be carried out free of performance lags 
induced by more traditional security controls. 
More than just a VM running CIF, this appliance gives users the ability to build or join a 
data sharing network with their partners and share potential threat data within seconds. 
The appliance also provides a framework to stay ahead of threats as events get shared 
and to act on these events. The training will breakdown the virtual appliance into its 
individual components by having attendees deploy each component with Ansible. We will 
cover each component and its role in the appliance: ssh-auth-logger honeypot, 
zyre/zeromq for p2p sharing, cifv3 for event store and later analysis, bro for honeypot 
network analysis, bro’s intel framework to stay ahead of potential threats, and 
components to allow integration into existing security monitoring infrastructure. We will 
demonstrate how components can be deployed in whole or part and orchestrated to suit 
an institution’s data sharing needs. 
 
Rebuilding a Plane in Flight: Refactors Under Pressure 
Instructor:​ Susan Sons (Indiana University) 
At some point, every engineer or project manager will have to take on a disaster. In these 
situations, it is easy to go into firefighting mode, trying to keep each new emergency at 
bay, instead of taking a systematic approach to fixing the underlying problems. This is 
why disgusting, brittle tangles of hundreds of thousands of lines of insecure spaghetti 
code stay in place so long. It is why you are inheriting a network of vulnerable SCADA 
components that the last four people were too afraid to fix. 
Attempting to untangle a disaster that cannot be taken out of service is terrifying. 
Eventually, it must be done, but often no one wants to take responsibility for the project 
until it is almost too late. However, there is method to the madness. Susan Sons shares a 
high-level approach to safely refactoring software and other complex systems while 
supporting production deployments that may themselves be complex and varied, drawing 
from her experience refactoring life-critical software and cyber-physical systems 
(ICS/SCADA). While these methods were forged working on some critical systems and 
software, they apply just as well to a web application hairball or a DevOps nightmare. 
Topics include: 
● Project management concerns: Resourcing, outside communication, and staging 
changes 
● Technical and architectural strategy: Supporting toolchains, triage, systems 
architecture, and refactor strategies 
● Balancing response to immediate security and stability concerns against 
long-term vulnerability reduction and maintainability 
 
Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Projects 
Instructors:​ Bob Cowles, Craig Jackson & Jim Marsteller (CTSC) 
This instructional session will be based on a cybersecurity planning guide (see, 
trustedci.org/guide​) developed with input from the Daniel K. Inouye Solar Telescope 
(DKIST) project, and in use at a number of NSF facilities and projects. The Guide was 
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developed to address the information security requirements outlined in NSF cooperative 
agreements, and provide solid guidance, tools, and resources. This session will be 
appropriate both for attendees of last year’s training of the same name, as well as 
newcomers. Though there will be a good deal of overlap, we will be updating our 
presentation, and supporting opportunities to explore areas in greater depth based on 
participants’ needs.  Some of the topics that will be covered include: 
● Building or Improving an Information Security Program 
● Unique and Critical Science Requirements, Constraints, and Security Controls 
● Information Security Policies and Procedures 
● The Role of Project Leadership and Risk Acceptance 
● Establishing a Risk Management Approach to Information Security 
● Defining, Identifying, and Classifying Information Assets 
● The Role of Risk Assessments within the Program Lifecycle 
● Baseline Controls and Best Practices 
● Topical Information Security Considerations:  Third-Party Relationships, Asset 
Management, Access Control, Physical Security, Monitoring, Logging, and 
Retention 
● Program Assessment and Evaluation 
While this session will be instructional in nature, it is also intended to be an interactive 
session to seek constructive feedback from attendees to further improve the guide.  There 
will be significant opportunities for discussion and Q&A. 
  
Automated Assessment Tools - Theory & Practice 
Instructors:​ Barton Miller & Elisa Heymann (University of Wisconsin / CTSC) 
Software assurance tools – tools that scan the source or binary code of a program to find 
weaknesses – are the first line of defense in assessing the security of a software project. 
These tools can catch flaws in a program that can affect both the correctness and safety 
of the code. This tutorial is relevant to anyone wanting to understand how those tools 
work, and learn how to use these automated assessment tools to minimize security flaws 
in the software they develop or manage. 
Description of the class: 
We will introduce the different types of analysis tools, how these tools work, their output 
and their limitations. We then talk about control flow analysis and data flow analysis, as 
they are the tools’ core to answer if certain code is safe or not. 
 
The next section of the tutorial explain how to use different commercial and open source 
tools for C/C++ and Java, and how to process the tools’ output.  For that we use simple 
test applications extracted from the NIST/NSA Juliet test suite, where each of these 
applications contain specific weaknesses, and the version of the same code with the 
weakness fixed.  The weaknesses we address are drawn from a collection of the most 
commonly occurring ones in real code, such as Relative Path Traversal, OS Command 
Injection, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Improper Neutralization of Script in an Error 
Message Web Page, Integer Overflow, Sensitive Information Uncleared Before Release, 
Uncaught Exception, and Use of Hard-coded Password. 
 
Then we will move on to the hands-on section of this tutorial.  The students will use the 
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Software Assurance Marketplace-SWAMP (https://continuousassurance.org/), which is an 
open facility that allows users to scan their software with different tools without the burden 
of dealing with tool acquisition, installation, and configuration.  Throughout the SWAMP 
users can access both commercial and open source software assessment tools.  By using 
the SWAMP the students will be able to identify problems in the given source code, 
modify the code, compile it, and submit it to the SWAMP for another assessment. 
 
To attend this tutorial, you will need to: 
 
1. Bring your own laptop. 
2. Have VirtualBox installed on your machine. 
1. Go to ​https://www.virtualbox.org/wiki/Downloads​ and download VirtualBox for 
your platform.   
2. Execute the program downloaded. 
3. Check that you are able to run VirtualBox. 
3. For the class exercises, we will use two virtual machines images.   
Please download them from: 
 




www.cs.wisc.edu/mist/ctsc-ubuntu-2.ova​ (4.3 GB) 
 
Save them on the local disk of the machine you will be using for the tutorial. If you have 
problems downloading these images, we will have copies at the class. 
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Program Agenda  
2017 NSF Cybersecurity Summit for Large Facilities and Cyberinfrastructure 
August 15 - August 17   Westin Arlington Gateway Arlington, Virginia  
https://trustedci.org/2017nsfsummit/  
PC: Steve Barnet, Tony Baylis, Mike Corn, Rion Dooley, Barb Fossum, David Halstead, Ardoth Hassler, Susan 
Ramsey, George Strawn  





8:00am Registration and Continental Breakfast (Pre-Function Hemingway) 
9:00am Morning and All Day Training Sessions Begin 
● WISE Community: WISE Information Security for Collaborating E-Infrastructures 
● Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations 
● Security Log Analysis Training 
● Legacy Industrial Control Systems - Secure / Replace / Ignore? 
● Handling Regulated Government Data, Protected Health Information, and CUI 
● Digital Forensics and Incident Response 
11:00am  Coffee Break 
11:30am  Training Sessions Resume 
1:00pm  Lunch provided 
2:00pm  Afternoon Training Sessions Begin and All Day Training Sessions Resume 
● WISE Community: WISE Information Security for Collaborating E-Infrastructures 
● Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations 
● Shared Intelligence Platform for Protecting our National Cyberinfrastructure 
● Rebuilding a Plane in Flight: Refactors Under Pressure 
● Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Projects 
● Automated Assessment Tools - Theory & Practice 
4:00pm  Coffee Break 
4:30pm  Training Sessions Resume 
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6:00pm  Sessions End 
Evening:  Dinner on your own 
 
Plenary Session  
Wednesday, August 16, 2017  
F. Scott Fitzgerald AB 
 
7:45am Sign-In and Continental Breakfast (Pre-Function AB) 
8:30am Welcome and NSF Address (Jim Marsteller / Irene Qualters) 
9:00am  Keynote #1: Jeff Spies - “A Workflow-Centric Approach to Increasing 
Reproducibility and Data Integrity” 
10:00am  CCoE Update (Von Welch) 
10:30am  Coffee Break 
11:00am  From Bare Metal to Virtual: Lessons Learned when a Supercomputing Institute Deploys 
its First Cloud (Evan F. Bollig) 
11:30am  Cornell Red Cloud: Campus-based Hybrid Cloud Computing 
12:00pm  Panel: Cybersecurity in the Face of Overwhelming Threats Moderator: Von Welch 
(Indiana University, CTSC) Panelists: Michael Corn (UCSD) Anita Nikolich (NSF) Kim 
Milford (REN-ISAC) 
1:00pm  Lunch and Table Topics - Lunch provided 
2:30pm  HTCondor (Todd Tannenbaum) 
3:00pm  Panel: Strategies to Develop a Diverse and Inclusive Cybersecurity Pipeline  Moderator: 
Tony Baylis Panelists: Aurelia Williams (Norfolk State University) Victor Piotrowski 
(NSF) Rodney Petersen (NIST) Ambareen Siraj (Tennessee Tech University/WiCyS) 
4:00pm  Coffee Break 
4:30pm  Beyond the Beltway: The Problems with NIST’s Approaches to Cybersecurity and 
Alternatives for NSF Science (Craig Jackson, Bob Cowles, Scott Russell) 
5:00pm  Finding Your Way in the Dark: Security from First Principles (Susan Sons) 
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Thursday, August 17, 2017  
F. Scott Fitzgerald AB 
7:45am Sign-In and Continental Breakfast (Pre-Function AB) 
8:30am  Keynote #2: Marjory Blumenthal - “Data, data, everywhere—how shall we live with 
it?” 
9:30am  Panel: Cloud Security & NSF Partnerships with Cloud Providers Moderator:  Susan 
Ramsey Panelists: Susie Adams (Azure/Microsoft) Mark Ryland (AWS) Matthew 
O’Connor (Google) 
10:30am  Coffee Break 
11:00am  The Applicability of HPC for Cyber Situational Awareness (Leslie Leonard) 
11:30am  Internet2 NOC Risk Assessment (Paul Howell) 
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WISE Feedback Gathered at the NSF Summit 
 
This August, WISE was warmly welcomed to the NSF Cybersecurity Summit 2017 in Arlington, 
Virginia. Many thanks to our hosts for facilitating a hugely useful and productive workshop! 
Doug Pearson from REN-ISAC kicked off the day with an interactive presentation of the pDNS 
Data Sharing project, aiming to pool anonymised passive DNS logs for the benefit of the R&E 
community. Our WISE colleagues were drafted in to play users, malicious DNS servers and the 
internet itself – to name but a few! 
Florence Hudson from internet2 presented on the impact of IoT devices on security and 
sparked the question, “are there IoT devices in our e-Infrastructures?” This is one conversation 
that we will be taking forwards in the coming months to understand the impact of IoT security 
for WISE members. 
Rob Quick from OSG took us “into the SWAMP” and demonstrated how we can assess common 
e-Infrastructure packages for security vulnerabilities in the SoftWare Assurance Market Place at 
http://mir-swamp.org/​. This platform is open for the R&E community so don’t hesitate to start 
analysing your own packages. 
Alf Moens from SURF got our brains working as we performed a risk assessment exercise using 
WISE’s newly published ​Risk Management Template​. Participants gained a new found 
appreciation of the challenges faced when quantifying the risks faced by their organisations. 
Dave Kelsey from STFC and Adam Slagel from XSEDE gathered feedback on ​SCIv2​ from willing 
volunteers who had completed a first assessment of their e-Infrastructures in anticipation of 
the workshop. We were struck by the similarities with some of the work being done by CTSC, in 
both security frameworks and risk assessment, and will be working closely together to see how 
we can benefit each other’s aims. The input received on SCIv2 during our day will be fed back 
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Bios for Speakers, Authors, Program Committee Members, 
Organizers, and Student Awardees 
 
In alphabetical order by surname 
 
Susie Adams​ is the Chief Technology Officer for Microsoft’s Federal Government business and brings 
with her over 30 years of IT experience. Susie joined Microsoft in 1999 and has held several leadership 
positions in Microsoft including the Director of the Microsoft Reston Virginia Technology Center and 
most recently the CTO of the Federal Civilian Business. 
Prior to joining Microsoft, she spent 16 years in the consulting arena working with customers in both the 
commercial and government sectors. She held a variety of management and leadership roles including 
practice manager, systems analyst and software developer. Susie is a past Fed100 award winner and has 
authored several books on the topics of software integration and web development. Susie is a graduate of 
George Mason University where she received a BS in Information Systems. 
* 
Steve Barnet ​has specialized in supporting scientific and academic computing for nearly 20 years. During 
that time, he has worked in multiple domains including storage, networking, high-throughput computing, 
and security. He handled his first incident in 1995, a compromised Solaris system providing several 
important infrastructure services. 
Steve currently works for the IceCube project, a kilometer scale neutrino detector located at the 
geographic South Pole. He began collaborating with CTSC in 2013 to develop a Cybersecurity plan for 
the IceCube facility. 
* 
Tom Barton​ is Sr Consultant for Cyber Security & Data Privacy at the University of Chicago and a 
consultant to Internet2. Previously he was Senior Director and Chief Information Security Officer at 
UChicago, and had earlier assignments as Director of IT Infrastructure and Director of Network Services 
at the University of Memphis, where he was a member of the mathematics faculty before turning to 
administration. He's a member of the Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure's Advisory 
Committee, the InCommon Federation's Technical Advisory Committee, the TIER Community Investors 
Council, the REFEDS Steering Committee, chaired the TIER Ad Hoc Advisory committee obsoleted by 
CACTI, and for many years led the Internet2 Grouper project. 
* 
Dr. Jim Basney​ is a senior research scientist in the cybersecurity group at the National Center for 
Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Jim's area of expertise is 
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identity management for scientific collaborations. He is PI of the CILogon and SciTokens projects and 
co- PI of the Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure and the Software Assurance 
Marketplace. Jim also contributes to the LIGO, LSST, and XSEDE projects. Jim received his PhD in 
computer sciences from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
* 
Tony Baylis​ is the senior management advocate for diversity and inclusion for the Laboratory. Tony is 
responsible for overseeing the laboratory’s interactions and successful execution in building, partnering 
and collaborating with governmental, educational, industrial, community interests and other stakeholders. 
LLNL has had a long history in working with Minority Serving Institutions, specifically relationships 
with American Indian Institutions, Hispanic Institutions, and Historically Black College and Universities. 
He represents the Laboratory on the subjects of Diversity and Inclusion, STEM, Outreach Efforts, and 
Student Programs. 
Tony's career represents 30 years of administrative, project, program, technical, and organizational 
management. He has worked in a scientific and technical environment for over 22 years and has worked 
as a consultant in industry as well. Tony has extensive experience networking with a broad range of 
academic, industry, government and non-profit organizations that has educated him and helped him in his 
career. He is a DOE Minorities in Energy Champion for the department and also serves on a number of 
conference program committees and advisory boards that promote STEM and diversity in science and 
technical careers. 
* 
Marjorie Blumenthal​ is a senior policy analyst and director of RAND's Science, Technology, and Policy 
Program. Prior to joining RAND, she served as executive director of the President's Council of Advisors 
on Science and Technology (PCAST) within the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. 
Blumenthal's PCAST projects addressed how systems engineering can improve the delivery of health 
care, the challenge of protecting privacy in the context of big data, new directions for cybersecurity, how 
information technology can improve education and training, the implications of new technologies for 
cities, and more. 
Previously Marjorie was an associate provost, academic at Georgetown University, developing academic 
strategy, strengthening the sciences and the overall research program, and promoting innovation in areas 
from international engagement to teaching and learning. Before starting at Georgetown, Blumenthal was 
the founding executive director of the National Academies' Computer Science and Telecommunications 
Board (CSTB). She convened and teamed with technologists, social scientists, and other experts, 
producing over 60 influential books and reports that addressed the full range of information technologies 
and their societal impacts. Blumenthal holds an M.P.P. from Harvard University. 
* 
 Leslee A. Bohland​ serves as the Administrative & Finance Director at Indiana University’s Center for 
Applied Cybersecurity Research (CACR). She is a graduate of the IU School of Business (B.S. ’93). 
Leslee comes to the CACR and CTSC from a background in Management, Finance and Accounting. She 
has worked with government divisions, as well as in the private sector. 
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* 
Evan Bollig​, is a senior scientific computing consultant with the Minnesota Supercomputing Institute at 
the University of Minnesota. Evan is the lead architect, developer, and evangelist for Stratus, a research 
compute cloud for NIH controlled-access data. Since 2012, Evan has been integral to the creation of a 
number of cloud-based, clinically-certified (i.e., CLIA) data analysis pipelines used by Fairview 
Hospital’s personalized medicine program. His other areas of interest include algorithm design on 
evolving HPC architectures (e.g., GPUs, FPGAs, and other accelerators), meshless numerical methods, 
and data visualization. Evan is a graduate of Florida State University (M.S. '09, Ph.D. '13), and proud 
alumnus of the NSF-funded SIParCS internship at the National Center for Atmospheric Research. 
* 
Diana Borecky​ serves as a Senior Administrative Asst. at Indiana University’s Center for Applied 
Cybersecurity Research (CACR). She has worked for IU for 19 years in the IU UITS Finance office, 
before joining CACR staff. 
* 
Michael Corn​ is the CISO of the University of California at San Diego where he manages the Security 
Office as well as the Identity and Access Management. His areas of interest include privacy, identity 
management, and cloud services. He has been an active speaker and author on security and privacy and 
has participated in numerous Educause and Internet2 initiatives. 
He is a member of the Internet2 Netplus Product Advisory Board and is the current co-chair of the 
Educause HEISC. Prior to joining UCSD he was the CISO & CPO and Deputy CIO of Brandeis 
University and was formally the CISO and Chief Privacy and Security Officer of the University of Illinois 
at Urbana- Champaign. He is a graduate of the University of Colorado at Boulder and the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
* 
Robert (Bob) Cowles​ is a principal in BrightLite Information Security performing cybersecurity 
assessments and consulting in research and education about information security. He served as CISO at 
SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory (1997-¬2012); participated in the development of security 
policies and procedures for the LHC Computing Grid (2001-¬2008); and was an instructor at the 
University of Hong Kong in information security (2000¬-2003). A contributor to Indiana University's 
CACR since 2013, he participated in the XSIM project on identity management and has been working 
with CTSC since 2015. In 2017, he was honored to be named as a CACR Senior Fellow. 
* 
Dominique Dalanni​ is a senior attending George Washington University majoring in computer science, 
with a specialization in information assurance and cybersecurity. In addition to her studies, Ms. Dalanni is 
currently a participant in the Federal Pathways Internship Program, and interning with NIST. She is a 
CyberCorps scholarship recipient at George Washington University, the president of the Women in Stem 
Club, vice president and student advocate for the Com participant in the puting Alliance of Hispanic 
Serving Institutions (CAHSI) Club CSUDH chapter. She also served as a research assistant in a project 
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funded by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and in 2015 was selected to represent her university as a 
CSU Trustee Award recipient and scholar. 
After completing her undergraduate education, Ms. Dalanni hopes to pursue a graduate degree at George 
Washington University in Computer Science with a specialization in Cybersecurity. Once she has 
received her graduate degree, Ms. Dalanni would like explore job opportunities which focus on threat 
analysis, governance, or on the overall security of industrial control systems. 
* 
Rion Dooley​ is principal investigator on the Agave Project a Science-as-a-Service API platform allowing 
researchers worldwide to manage data, run code, collaborate freely, and integrate their science anywhere. 
His previous projects span areas of identity management, distributed web security, full-stack application 
development, data management, cloud services, and high performance computing. Rion earned a Ph.D. in 
computer science from Louisiana State University. Rion actively puts his wife and two daughters at the 
top of his list of accomplishments. He hopes his work can someday edge out dancing teddy bears and 
smear-proof lipstick on their lists of favorite inventions. 
* 
William Drake​ is the overnight supervisor for Indiana University's Data Center Operations department. 
He leads a team that is tasked with ensuring physical security at both of IU's data center facilities as well 
as monitoring the infrastructure that supports IU's enterprise and research computing systems. William is 
currently a student at IU pursuing a bachelor's degree at in informatics with a cognate in security 
informatics. 
* 
Barbara Fossum​ is a senior executive with over 25 years of leadership and management experience in 
higher academic and government sectors including high performance computing, data visualization, 
engineering and academic research. Barbara contributed several federally funded grants including the 
Network for Engineering Simulations where she successfully directed all operations and the development 
of a curated data repository for all earthquake engineering data. She is currently the CEO of BMF 
Consulting, providing extensive experience in human resource planning and operations, organizational 
change, team building, organizational effectiveness and facilitative leadership. 
* 
Nikita Golubets​ is a Student at Eastern Michigan University with a major in Information Assurance & 
Cyber Defense, Nikita Golubets finished his internship with the Security Solutions team at Cisco and will 
be graduating Spring of 2018. He had a chance to work with the TIP, CIRA, and Talos team and created 
an Automated Customer Attack Surface tool that gathers threat intelligence. He is a part of the National 
Cybersecurity Student Association that provides students with resources, mentors, as well as training in 
the field. Having a passion for the field, he attends Blackhat and Defcon security conferences and takes 
part in ISTS/ CCDC competitions. 
* 
Dr. David Halstead ​is the CIO for the National Radio Astronomy Observatory. After obtaining a PhD in 
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the computational simulation of surface catalysis in 1990, he moved to HPC research at the DOE Scalable 
Computing Laboratory in Ames Lab, implementing commodity parallel processing cluster solutions to 
benefit research in surface science, chemistry, physics and biology. In 2002 he moved into industry with 
Celera Genomics to drive the Strategic Platform Initiative; transitioning away from the costly leased 
computer systems used to sequence the human genome, to scalable HPC systems supporting proteomics 
and therapeutics research. Since joining NRAO in 2008, his responsibilities are divided between Data 
Management for the Observatory’s HPC infrastructure in support of the national radio telescopes, and the 
general IT support for NRAO’s 500+ employees. He has served on the committees for SC94, SC99, 
SC05, SC10; SC13; SC14; SC16 and is a founding member of the ACM’s SIGHPC Education Chapter. 
* 
Ardoth Hassler​ retired in May as Associate Vice President of University Information Services at 
Georgetown University. Her work focused on policy, planning and research, including being the PI for 
NSF CC¬NIE and CC-IIE awards. In addition, she served as Interim Director of the Student Information 
Systems group. 
Ardoth was on loan to the National Science Foundation 2007¬2011 where she served as Senior 
Information Technology Advisor in the Office of the Chief Information Officer in the NSF Office of 
Information and Resource Management, Division of Information Systems. Her activities included work 
related to cybersecurity best practices for large research facilities, working on technology policies for the 
Foundation and large research facilities, assisting NSF in joining the InCommon Federation and 
introducing concepts of single sign-on logon to Research.gov, leading the “SSN Be Gone” project to 
remove SSNs from FastLane and other systems where there was no business need, working on NSF’s 
“Got Green”, initiative, etc. She has prior experience serving on the program committees of the NSF 
Cybersecurity Summit, EDUCAUSE Annual Conferences, etc. She has a BS in Math (CS minor) from 
Oklahoma State University and an MS in Biostatistics from the University of Oklahoma. 
* 
Elisa Heymann​ is a Senior Scientist at the Computer Sciences Department of the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, and an Associate Professor in the Computer Architecture and Operating Systems 
Department at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB). She co-directs the MIST software 
vulnerability assessment project in collaboration with her colleagues at the University of Wisconsin. 
Heymann is part of CTSC, the NFS cyber security center for excellence, where she works on Software 
Assurance training and engagements. 
Heymann carries out training in universities, companies, and conferences around the world. Heymann's 
research interests include security and resource management for Grid and Cloud environments, and 
cyber-security in transportation. Her research is supported by NSF, the Spanish government, the European 
Commission, and NATO. Heymann received her M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Computer Science from the 
Autonomous University of Barcelona (Spain) in 1995 and 2001 respectively. 
* 
Paul Howell​ is Chief Cyberinfrastructure Security Officer at Internet2. Joining Internet2 in July, 2014, 
Paul oversees and coordinates all security efforts across the Internet2 infrastructure and is responsible for 
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setting organizational policies and approaches while engaging with the Internet2 member community. He 
is responsible for the creation and implementation of Internet2’s information security program, advising 
on risk management and infrastructure; conducting security education, training, and awareness activities; 
monitoring compliance with security programs and applicable laws; and coordinating investigation and 
reporting of security incidents. Paul has more than 30 years of experience in IT security. In 2004, Paul 
was named The University of Michigan’s Chief Security Officer. This was an inaugural role for the 
university, with Paul leading the development and implementation of the university’s information 
assurance program. 
* 
Craig Jackson ​is Chief Policy Analyst at the Indiana University Center for Applied Cybersecurity 
Research (CACR), where his research interests include information security program development and 
governance, legal and regulatory regimes' impact on information security and cyber resilience, evidence- 
based security, and innovative defenses. He is a Co-PI of the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, 
and leads CACR’s collaborative efforts with Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division. He is a 
graduate of the IU Maurer School of Law, IU School of Education, and Washington University in St. 
Louis. In addition to his litigation experience, Craig’s research, design, project management, and 
psychology background includes work at the IU Center for Research on Learning and Technology and the 
Washington University in St. Louis School of Medicine. 
* 
Ryan Kiser​ is the Technology Specialist at the Indiana University Center for Applied Cybersecurity 
(CACR). Ryan comes to CACR from a system administration and small business consulting background. 
His current responsibilities include HIPAA compliance and risk assessment for university and external IT 
systems, managing the center’s technical resources, as well as technical coordination and event planning. 
* 
Scott Koranda,​ PhD, specializes on identity management architecture for research organizations. Since 
2008, Scott Koranda has designed, deployed, and supported production SAML infrastructures including 
both the Shibboleth Identity Provider (IdP) and Service Provider (SP) software, for the research and 
education sectors. 
A member of the Laser Interferometer Gravitational Wave Observatory (LIGO) collaboration for over 10 
years, Scott has served as the lead architect for the LIGO Identity and Access Management project since 
2007. He was co-principal investigator on the NSF grant that funds COmanage development, and is a 
consultant with Spherical Cow Group. 
* 
Mark Krenz​ is the Lead Security Analyst at Indiana University's Center for Applied Cybersecurity 
Research with over two decades of experience in information security and system administration spread 
across multiple sectors. His interests at CACR include policy development, operational security 
development, security auditing and security education. He studied Computer Science and Mathematics at 
Indiana University. 
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* 
Steven Lee​ joined Cornell University Center for Advanced Computing in 2007 as a systems consultant. 
In 2011, Steven helped to bring Red Cloud, a private research cloud with AWS-compatible API, into 
production to better accommodate workloads that do not fit into batch queues of HPC clusters. 
He is currently working on Aristotle Cloud Federation, a federation of 3 research clouds at Cornell, 
University at Buffalo, and University of California Santa Barbara, to support scientists with flexible 
workloads and analysis tools for large scale data sets. Prior to Cornell, Steven worked as a systems and 
embedded software engineer in the telecommunications industry. He has a B.A. in computer science from 
Cornell University. 
* 
Leslie Leonard​ is the Cybersecurity Research Lead for the Department of Defense (DoD) High 
Performance Computing Modernization Program's (HPCMP) security team. The mission of the DoD 
HPCMP is to accelerate technology development and transition to superior defense capabilities, which 
provide DoD scientists and engineers with the resources necessary to solve the most demanding problems 
through the strategic application of high performance computing, high speed networks, and computational 
expertise. 
Leslie leads Research and Development (R&D) for new technologies, tools, and techniques that enable 
the HPCMP to defend, mitigate, and secure five Defense Supercomputing Resource Centers (DSRCs) and 
the Defense Research and Engineering Network (DREN). She received her B.S./M.S. degrees in 
Computer Science from Jackson State University and a Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of 
Maryland. 
* 
James A. Marsteller, Jr.​ is the Pittsburgh Supercomputer Center Chief Information Security Officer. He 
has extensive security leadership experience with the TeraGrid and XSEDE security operations team and 
is a Co-PI for the Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure, the NSF Cybersecurity Center of 
Excellence. James also has served as the program chair for annual NSF Cybersecurity Summit for Large 
Facilities and Cyberinfrastructure since 2007. He has also served on the board of directors for the 
Pittsburgh chapter of the FBI Infragard program for many years. He holds a Master of Information 
Technology Management from Carnegie Mellon University and is a Certified Information Systems 
Security Professional. 
* 
Kim Milford​ began serving as Executive Director of REN-ISAC in April 2014. She works with 
members, partners, sponsors, and advisory committees to direct strategic objectives in support of 
members, providing services and information that allow higher educational institutions to better defend 
local technical environments and is responsible for overseeing administration and operations. 
Since joining Indiana University in June 2007, Ms. Milford has served in several roles leading strategic IT 
initiatives. As Chief Privacy Officer, she coordinated privacy-related efforts while serving on IU's 
Assurance Council, chairing the Committee of Data Stewards, and directing the work of the University 
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Information Policy Office including IU's IT incident response team. From 2005 – 2007, Ms. Milford 
worked as Information Security Officer at the University of Rochester leading an information security 
program that included disaster recovery planning, identity management, incident response, and user 
awareness. In her position as Information Security Manager at University of Wisconsin-Madison from 
1998 - 2005, she assisted in establishing the university's information security department and co-led in the 
development of an annual security conference. 
Ms. Milford provides cybersecurity, information policy, and privacy expertise and presentations at 
national and regional conferences, seminars and consortia. Ms. Milford has a B.S. in Accounting from 
Saint Louis University in St. Louis, Missouri and a J.D. from John Marshall Law School in Chicago, 
Illinois. 
* 
Barton Miller ​the Vilas Distinguished Achievement Professor and the Amar and Belinder Sohi Professor 
in Computer Sciences at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is Chief Scientist for the DHS 
Software Assurance Marketplace research facility. He co-directs the MIST software vulnerability 
assessment project in collaboration with his colleagues at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He 
also leads Paradyn Parallel Performance Tool project, which is investigating performance and 
instrumentation technologies for parallel and distributed applications and systems. His research interests 
include systems security, binary and malicious code analysis and instrumentation extreme scale systems, 
parallel and distributed program measurement and debugging, and mobile computing. 
Miller's research is supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Energy, 
National Science Foundation, NATO, and various corporations. In 1988, Miller founded the field of Fuzz 
random software testing, which is the foundation of many security and software engineering disciplines. 
In 1992, Miller (working with then-student, Prof. Jeffrey Hollingsworth, founded the field of dynamic 
binary code instrumentation and coined the term "dynamic instrumentation". Dynamic instrumentation 
forms the basis for his current efforts in malware analysis and instrumentation. 
Miller was the chair of the IDA Center for Computing Sciences Program Review Committee, a member 
of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Computing, Communications and Networking Division Review 
Committee, and has been on the U.S. Secret Service Electronic Crimes Task Force (Chicago Area), the 
Advisory Committee for Tuskegee University's High Performance Computing Program, and the Advisory 
Board for the International Summer Institute on Parallel Computer Architectures, Languages, and 
Algorithms in Prague. Miller is an active participant in the European Union APART performance tools 
initiative. Miller received his Ph.D. degree in Computer Science from the University of California, 
Berkeley in 1984. He is a Fellow of the ACM. 
* 
Sinjoni Mukhopadhyay​ is a second year PhD student pursuing a degree in Computer Science, with 
specialization in storage system security. She is a research assistant at the University’s Center for 
Research in Storage Systems. Sinjoni is currently working on possible alternatives to encryption for long 
term archives. Ongoing work includes efficient computations on secret-split datastores like patterns in 
reconstruction and secure searching. She is looking for internships for the summer of 2018, with 
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opportunities that will enhance her experience in the field of long-term secure archives. After completion 
of her program she hopes to explore job opportunities that will help her apply her expertise in providing 
better security alternatives for archival data. 
* 
Nicholas J. Multari​ provides programmatic and technical guidance to cybersecurity research programs at 
the Pacific Northwest National Lab (PNNL) including the multi-year lab directed research and 
development (LDRD) initiative focusing on Asymmetric Resilient Cybersecurity (ARC). In that role, he 
led the development of the multi-disciplinary research agenda required to provide a theoretical basis for, 
and the application of, technologies that reduce or eliminate a cyber-attacker’s current asymmetric 
advantage. Prior to joining PNNL, he was the manager for trusted cyber technology at Boeing Research 
and Technology in Seattle, Washington. In that position, Nick directed and led a group of researchers 
conducting research, development, and technology assessment of cyber and cybersecurity technologies in 
support of Boeing Business Unit needs. In 2008, he served as a consultant to the USAF Scientific 
Advisory Board (SAB) investigating the effects of the contested cyber environment on the USAF 
mission. 
Other positions held include five years as a Senior Security Engineer with Scitor Corporation in Northern 
Virginia, and 20 years as a computer scientist in the Air Force retiring as a Lt. Col. He is a member of 
external advisory boards at University of Washington and Iowa State University. He received a bachelor’s 
degree in mathematics from Manhattan College, New York; a master’s degree in computing and 
information science from Trinity University, Texas; and a PhD in computer science from the University 
of Texas at Austin. 
* 
Anita Nikolich​ is Program Director for Cybersecurity in the Division of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure at 
the National Science Foundation (NSF). Prior to her work at the NSF she served as the Executive Director 
of Infrastructure at the University of Chicago. Past assignments include Director of Global Data 
Networking at Aon and Director of Security for Worldcom. She has explored how information 
technology and secure networking can best support the creation and sharing of scientific knowledge in 
virtual, mobile and physical contexts. She holds a Master of Science from The University of Pennsylvania 
and a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Chicago. 
* 
Matthew O'Connor​ specializes in Security, Compliance, and (Anti)Abuse Products, on the Google 
Cloud Platform at Google. He serves in a CTO role for the Google Cloud Compliance Program, 
developing partnerships with Federal and private customers, and overseeing Managed Services. He 
attended Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley and obtained a BS in Computer Science Engineering 
from Santa Clara University. 
* 
Imani Palmer ​is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Computer Science at the University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign. Imani's areas of interest include cyber & systems security, digital forensics, and 
data analysis. She is a member of the Systems Research Group under the advisement of Roy Campbell. 
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She 
received her B.S. in computer science from the University of Pittsburgh. After graduation, she is 
interested in a research position that allows her to continue to explore her interest in security. 
* 
Rodney Petersen​ is the director of the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) at the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the U.S. Department of Commerce. He 
previously served as the Managing Director of the EDUCAUSE Washington Office and a Senior 
Government Relations Officer. He founded and directed the EDUCAUSE Cybersecurity Initiative and 
was the lead staff liaison for the Higher Education Information Security Council. 
Prior to joining EDUCAUSE, he worked at two different times for the University of Maryland - first as 
Campus Compliance Officer in the Office of the President and later as the Director of IT Policy and 
Planning in the Office of the Vice President and Chief Information Officer. He also completed one year of 
federal service as an Instructor in the Academy for Community Service for AmeriCorps' National Civilian 
Community Corps. He is the co-editor of a book entitled "Computer and Network Security in Higher 
Education". He received his law degree from Wake Forest University and bachelors degrees in political 
science and business administration from Alma College. He was awarded a certificate as an Advanced 
Graduate Specialist in Education Policy, Planning, and Administration from the University of Maryland. 
* 
Victor Piotrowski​ is responsible for several programs related to Cybersecurity Education and Workforce 
Development. In particular, he oversees the CyberCorps(R): Scholarship for Service (SFS) program with 
FY2014 budget of $45 million. This program seeks to increase the number of qualified students entering 
the field of cybersecurity and to increase the capacity of the United States higher education enterprise to 
continue to produce professionals in this field to meet the needs of our increasingly technological society. 
He is also a Program Officer in a NSF-wide program Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC) 
supporting projects that address cybersecurity from one or more perspectives: Trustworthy Computing 
Systems; Social, Behavioral and Economics; and Cybersecurity Education. 
Before coming to NSF, Dr. Piotrowski served as a Professor and Chair of the Computer Science 
Department at the University of Wisconsin and as a faculty at the Institute of Informatics in Poland. He 
has a 20-year experience in research, teaching and consulting in Information Assurance and holds several 
cybersecurity certifications. 
Dr. Piotrowski is the recipient of the Marcinkiewicz Prize by the Polish Mathematical Society and a 
finalist of the UW Board of Regents Teaching Excellence Award. He is a graduate of the Federal 
Executive Institute residency program Leadership for a Democratic Society and the Harvard Kennedy 
School Executive Education Cybersecurity Policy and Technology program. 
* 
Irene Qualters​ is the Division Director of the Division of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure at NSF. As a 
recognized leader in cyberinfrastructure infrastructure, she represents NSF in several interagency and 
international efforts that span software, data, and computation. For example, she has represented NSF in 
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the creation of the presidential initiative, NSCI. 
Prior to her NSF career, Irene had a distinguished 30-year career in industry, with a number of executive 
leadership positions in the technology sector, in startups as well as a long tenure at Cray Research leading 
R&D, and six years with Merck Research Labs leading their Global Cyberinfrastructure for Research. 
* 
Susan Ramsey ​is a Risk Assessor and Security Engineer at the National Center for Atmospheric 
Research. She has over twenty years of experience building enterprise infrastructure and cloud 
computing. She joined NCAR in 2014 and promptly launched multiple initiatives to tackle compliance 
and identity management. Her latest projects include building a FISMA moderate segment and an 
organization wide Continuous Monitoring Plan. She has an MS in Computer Information Technology 
from Regis University, (thesis on Vulnerability Assessment). She is currently working towards a second 
Master of Science degree, in Information Security Engineering, from SANS Technical Institute. 
* 
Warren Raquel ​is a Senior Security Engineer at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications. 
His duties include security operations, incident response and security awareness for NCSA, Blue Waters 
and XSEDE. He has given talks and taught classes on Digital Forensics and Incident Response, two fields 
in which has specialized in for the last decade. 
* 
Scott Russell​ is a Senior Policy Analyst with CACR, where his work focuses on the improvement of 
federal cybersecurity standards. A lawyer and researcher, Scott specializes in privacy, cybersecurity, and 
international law, and his past research has included cybersecurity due diligence norms under 
international law, cybersecurity self-governance, international data jurisdiction, and constitutional issues 
on digital surveillance. Scott received his B.A. in Computer Science and History from the University of 
Virginia, received his J.D. from Indiana University, interned at MITRE, and served as a postdoctoral 
fellow at CACR. 
* 
Mark Ryland​ is the technology leader for Amazon Web Service’s Worldwide Public Sector (WWPS) 
team, reporting to the Vice President of WWPS. Mr. Ryland leads a team of Solutions Architects and 
Professional Services / Rapid Adoption Program Engineers who provide AWS technical evangelism, 
architectural guidance, knowledge transfer, technical training, and implementation services to government 
and education customers around the globe. 
Mark also serves as a key interface between the WWPS team and the engineering, security, and 
compliance teams at AWS, ensuring that public sector customer requirements are front-and-center in 
product/service planning and roadmaps. Mark holds a JD from University of California Berkeley School 
of Law, and a BA in Philosophy from UC San Diego. 
* 
Phil Salkie​ is a computer scientist who has been working as an industrial controls and automation 
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engineer since 1984. His software and hardware designs serve sectors as diverse as food packaging, 
broadcast television, emergency power generation, water purification, sewage processing, surgical suture 
manufacture, biopharmaceuticals, specialty chemicals, laundry transport, semiconductor equipment 
manufacture, and nuclear power plant infrastructure. He is managing partner of Jeneriah Industrial 
Automation. 
* 
Anurag Shankar​ is a senior security analyst at Indiana University’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity 
Research (CACR). His expertise includes regulatory compliance (HIPAA, FISMA, CUI) and 
cybersecurity risk management. He has helped numerous institutions tackle HIPAA compliance and is 
responsible for developing a NIST based risk management framework and using it to align IU's central 
research and enterprise cyberinfrastructures with HIPAA. His prior engagements include nearly twenty 
years with IU’s central IT organization developing, delivering, and managing Unix support, massive data 
storage, the national Teragrid project, and supporting the research mission of the IU School of Medicine. 
He played a key role in building IU's research data storage environments, for supporting IU's Indiana 
Genomics Initiative and other life sciences efforts, and for creating information infrastructures and 
technology solutions for the Indiana Clinical and Translational Sciences Institute (CTSI). He is a 
computational astrophysicist by training (Ph.D. University of Illinois, '90). 
* 
Rachel Shima​, attending California State Polytechnic University. 
* 
Dr. Ambareen Siraj​ is currently serving as the Director of the Cybersecurity Education, Research, and 
Outreach Center at Tennessee Tech. She is also a Professor at the Computer Science department. Dr. 
Siraj's research areas of interest include smart grid security, sensor alert fusion with alert correlation and 
alert clustering, security metrics, security education and workforce development. She has authored/co- 
authored around forty journal and conference articles in these areas. She leads National Science 
Foundation Projects "Tennessee CyberCorps: A Hybrid Program in Cybersecurity", "Tennessee Tech 
Gen-Cyber Camps", "Capacity Building in Cybersecurity: Broadening Participation of Women in 
Cybersecurity through Women in Cybersecurity Conference & Professional Development", 
"CyberWorkshops: Resources and Strategies for Teaching Cybersecurity in Computer Science", and 
"Security Knitting Kit: Integrating Security into Traditional CS Courses". Dr. Siraj is the Founder and 
Chair of the Women in Cybersecurity (WiCyS) conference. She also leads the effort in establishment of 
the Middle Tennessee Cybersecurity Consortium (MTCC). She serves as the faculty advisor of Tech 
Cybersecurity Club for students. 
* 
Susan Sons​ serves as a Senior Systems Analyst at Indiana University's Center for Applied Cybersecurity 
Research, having come from a background in abuse management, software engineering, and pentesting. 
Susan considers herself a “generalist hacker” with specialties in ICS/SCADA security, secure software 
engineering, social engineering, and systems programming. Susan is President of the Internet Civil 
Engineering Institute (https://icei.org), a nonprofit dedicated to supporting and securing the common 
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software infrastructure we all depend on. Her recent publications have been with O’Reilly Publishing and 
Linux Journal. More on Susan’s projects can be found at http://security.engineering. 
* 
Jeffrey Spies​ is the co-founder and Chief Technology Officer of the Center for Open Science (COS), a 
non-profit technology company missioned to increase openness, integrity, and reproducibility of scholarly 
research. He is also the co-director of SHARE, a partnership with the Association of Research Libraries to 
create a free, open data set of scholarly research activity across the research lifecycle. Jeff received his 
Ph.D. in Quantitative Psychology from the University of Virginia, where he now holds a Visiting 
Assistant Professor position in the Department of Engineering and Society. His dissertation included the 
development of the Open Science Framework (OSF)--a free, open source workflow management system 
and platform as a service that is now the flagship product of COS. 
Jeff has a background in computer science and has conducted research in computational and statistical 
modeling as well as substantive domains including autism, non-verbal communication, and motor control. 
He continues to apply his research on scientific incentives, workflow, and reproducibility at COS and is 
regularly invited to speak on these topics. Jeff recently testified at a United States House congressional 
hearing on the role of openness and reproducibility in science. 
* 
Amy Starzynski Coddens​ serves as the Education, Outreach and Training Manager at Indiana 
University’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research (CACR). She is a graduate of the IU School of 
Education (M.S. ’06 & M.S. ’09). Amy comes to the CACR and CTSC from a background in P-16 
education and outreach. She has worked for the government, in industry and in academia, contributing to 
projects with the New England Research Institute, Harvard’s PEAR Institute, the United States 
Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs, NASA and the IU Kelley School of 
Business. 
* 
George O. Strawn​ is currently the director of the Board on Research Data and Information at the 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (having failed at retirement). Prior to joining 
the Academies, Dr. Strawn was the director of the National Coordination Office (NCO) for the 
Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program and co-chair of 
the NITRD interagency committee. Dr. Strawn held these positions while on leave from the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) to the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Whitehouse. Prior to his 
NITRD responsibilities, Dr. Strawn was the NSF Chief Information Officer. And prior to that, Dr. Strawn 
served in a number of capacities in the NSF Directorate for Computer and Information Science and 
Engineering (CISE). These included the executive officer of CISE, director of the CISE Division of 
Advanced Networking Infrastructure and Research, where he led NSF's efforts in the Presidential Next 
Generation Internet Initiative, and NSFnet Program Officer where he was part of the team that 
transitioned the experimental ARPAnet into the global Internet. Before to coming to NSF, Dr. Strawn was 
a Computer Science faculty member at Iowa State University (ISU) and a staff member in the 
Computation Center. He served terms as director of the Computation Center and as chair of the Computer 
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Science Department. Dr. Strawn received his Ph.D. in Mathematics from Iowa State University 
and his B.A. Magna Cum Laude in Mathematics and Physics from Cornell College. He is a fellow of the 
American Association of the Advancement of Science and a member of the Cosmos Club. 
* 
Todd Tannenbaum​ is a Researcher in the Department of Computer Sciences at UW-Madison with over 
19 years of experience developing production distributed computing environments. He directs the 
development staff and serves as the Technical Lead for the HTCondor Project, a distributed computing 
research group that produces the award-winning HTCondor software. Previous to his involvement with 
HTCondor, Todd served as the Director of the Model Advanced Facility, a high-performance computing 
center in the UW-Madison College of Engineering, and also as a Technology Editor for Network 
Computing magazine. He received B.S. and M.S. degrees in computer science from UW-Madison. 
* 
Von Welch​ is the director of Indiana University’s Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research (CACR) 
and PI for the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (CTSC). Additionally, he is the CISO of the 
Software Assurance Market Place, a DHS-funded facility to foster software assurance and software 
assurance research, and serves on the InCommon Steering Committee as an advisor for the research 
community. Previously he has worked with a range of high visibility projects to provide cybersecurity to 
the broader scientific and engineering community, including TeraGrid, Open Science Grid, Ocean 
Observatory Infrastructure, and GENI. His work in software and standards includes authoring two IETF 
RFCS and the contributing to the creation of the well-known CILogon and MyProxy projects. 
* 
Dr. Aurelia T. Williams ​is the Chairman and Professor of Computer Science at Norfolk State University 
(NSU). In this capacity, Dr. Williams manages oversight of two graduate programs in Computer Science 
and Cybersecurity and two undergraduate programs in Computer Science and Information Technology. 
As department chair and a member of the Cybersecurity team she has helped Cybersecurity at Norfolk 
State to grow across the departments at NSU, regionally and nationally. During her stewardship as chair 
of the Computer Science department, the Cybersecurity initiative has received 33 million dollars in 
Cybersecurity funding, received re-designation as a DHS/NSA Center of Academic Excellence in Cyber 
Defense Education, launched a MS Cybersecurity program and hosted the Vice President of the United 
States of America. 
Dr. Williams is a successful manager and has been actively involved in Cybersecurity. Her research has 
focused on the application of Digital Forensics applied to Cloud Computing via the Information 
Assurance – Research, Education and Development Institute (IA-REDI), located at NSU, in addition to 
other aspects of Information Assurance and Security. She is the Principal Investigator of the department’s 
award of $25M Consortium Enabling Cybersecurity Opportunities and Research (CECOR) where NSU 
leads a consortium of thirteen HBCUS and two DoE national laboratories to increase the workforce 
pipeline in Cybersecurity. She is a Co-PI of the NSF Scholarship for Service grant and has served as a 
mentor to students in the program. She is also a researcher on the Center of Excellence in Cybersecurity 
Research project. Dr. Williams uses these opportunities to serve as a research advisor to graduate and 
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undergraduate students completing their theses, projects and capstone courses. 
Dr. Williams is a member of three professional and honorary societies. She volunteers in her community 
where she participates in various programs that promote the STEM (science, technology, engineering, and 
math) fields to students from elementary to college age. In addition to offering presentations on 
Cybersecurity topics to her peers and children, she was featured on the cover of BEHOLD, NSU’s 
Alumni magazine for her work in successfully encouraging underrepresented students to pursue 
Computer Science and Cybersecurity. She received a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science from 
Norfolk State University, a master’s. degree in Computer Science from Johns Hopkins University and a 
doctoral degree from Pace University in New York. 
* 
Nancy Wilkins-Diehr ​directs the NSF-funded Science Gateways Community Institute and is a 
co-principal investigator on the NSF XSEDE award where she co-directs the Extended Collaborative 
Support program. She has been with the San Diego Supercomputer Center since 1993 and has held a 
variety of management positions there. Prior to that she held engineering positions with General Atomics 
and General Dynamics in San Diego. Nancy received her Bachelor's degree from Boston College in 
Mathematics and Philosophy and her Master's degree in Aerospace Engineering from San Diego State 
University. 
* 
Alex Withers​, Senior Security Engineer, NCSA. 
  
 









Appendix H: Training Evaluation Summary Report and 




















Q1 Which options best describe your job or position? Check all that apply.
Answered: 11 Skipped: 0












0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Member / leader of an NSF project
NSF Program Officer
Campus IT Professional / CIO
Cybersecurity Researcher
Personnel from another federal program (NSA, DOE/ESNet, etc.)
Other
1 / 22





Q2 How would you characterize your job in relationship to cybersecurity?
Please check all that apply.
Answered: 11 Skipped: 0









0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
I am a cybersecurity professional
I am a technical professional who has knowledge of cybersecurity
I have management responsibility for cybersecurity
Other (please specify)
2 / 22




Q3 Based on your overall experience with the August 15 training
sessions, would you participate in training offered at future summits?



















Q5 Which morning session did you attend?
















0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
WISE Community: WISE Information Security for Collaborating E-Infrastructures
Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations
Security Log Analysis Training
Legacy Industrial Control Systems - Secure / Replace / Ignore?
Handling Regulated Government Data, Protected Health Information, and CUI
Digital Forensics and Incident Response
I did not attend a morning session
5 / 22




Q6 How would you rate your level of pre-training familiarity with the topics
covered by this morning training session?

















Q7 How would you rate your overall experience with the morning
training?
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Q8 Please rate your experience with the morning training in these areas:

































































Excellent Good Average Below Average Poor N/A
Room Layout /
Comfort Level
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%







Room Layout / Comfort
Level
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Q9 Was this morning training better than what you expected, worse than
what you expected, or about what you expected?














0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
A great deal better
Quite a bit better
Somewhat better
About what was expected
Somewhat worse
Quite a bit worse
A great deal worse
10 / 22






Q10 How useful to your work was this morning training?
















Not at all useful
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Q13 Which afternoon session did you attend?
















0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
WISE Community: WISE Information Security for Collaborating E-Infrastructures
Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations
Shared Intelligence Platform for Protecting our National Cyberinfrastructure
Rebuilding a Plane in Flight: Refractors Under Pressure
Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Projects
Automated Assessment Tools - Theory & Practice
I did not attend an afternoon session.
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Q14 How would you rate your level of pre-training familiarity with the
topics covered by this afternoon training session?

















Q15 How would you rate your overall experience with the afternoon
training?
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Q16 Please rate your experience with the afternoon training in these
areas:

































































Excellent Good Average Below Average Poor N/A
Room Layout /
Comfort Level
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Level
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Q17 Was this afternoon training session better than what you expected,
worse than what you expected, or about what you expected?














0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
A great deal better
Quite a bit better
Somewhat better
About what was expected
Somewhat worse
Quite a bit worse
A great deal worse
19 / 22






Q18 How useful to your work was this afternoon training?
















Not at all useful
20 / 22







Q1 Which options best describe your job or position? Check all that apply.
Answered: 45 Skipped: 0












0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Member / leader of an NSF project
NSF Program Officer
Campus IT Professional / CIO
Cybersecurity Researcher
Personnel from another federal program (NSA, DOE/ESNet, etc.)
Other
1 / 16





Q2 Where do you work primarily?












Q3 How would you characterize your job in relationship to cybersecurity?
Please check all that apply.
Answered: 45 Skipped: 0









0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
I am a cybersecurity professional
I am a technical professional who has knowledge of cybersecurity
I have management responsibility for cybersecurity
Other (please specify)
3 / 16








Q4 What sessions of the summit did you attend? Check all that apply.





























0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Day 1 Morning: WISE Community: WISE Information Security for Collaborating E-Infrastructures
Day 1 Morning: Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations
Day 1 Morning: Security Log Analysis Training
Day 1 Morning: Legacy Industrial Control Systems - Secure / Replace / Ignore?
Day 1 Morning: Handling Regulated Government Data, Protected Health Information, and CUI
4 / 16












Total Respondents: 45  
Day 1 Morning: Digital Forensics and Incident Response
Day 1 Morning: WISE Community: WISE Information Security for Collaborating E-Infrastructures (continued)
Day 1 Afternoon: Federated Identity Management for Research Organizations (continued)
Day 1 Afternoon: Shared Intelligence Platform for Protecting our National Cyberinfrastructure
Day 1 Afternoon: Rebuilding a Plane in Flight: Refractors Under Pressure
Day 1 Afternoon: Developing Cybersecurity Programs for NSF Projects
Day 1 Afternoon: Automated Assessment Tools - Theory & Practice
Day 2 (Aug 18): Plenary Session
Day 3 (Aug 19): Plenary Session
5 / 16








Q5 How would you rate your overall experience with the 2017 summit?
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Q6 Please rate your experience with the 2017 summit in these areas:
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Convenience of Time of Year
Convenience of Tuesday, Wednesday,
Thursday Dates
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Q7 Was this summit better than what you expected, worse than what you
expected, or about what you expected?














0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
A great deal better
Quite a bit better
Somewhat better
About what was expected
Somewhat worse
Quite a bit worse
A great deal worse
9 / 16








Q8 How useful to your work was the information discussed at the
summit?
















Not at all useful
10 / 16









Q9 If you attended last year's summit, how does this year's compare?














0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
This year's summit was much better than last year's.
This year's summit was better than last year's.
This year's summit was about the same as last year's.
This year's summit was worse than last year's.
This year's summit was much worse than last year's.
I did not attend last year's summit.
11 / 16








Q10 How would you describe the balance between structured
presentations and informal networking opportunities?












0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES
Much too little time for informal networking
Too little time for informal networking
About the right balance
Too little time for structured presentations
Much too little time for structured presentations
12 / 16






Q11 Would you like to attend future summits?




















Q12 What presentation format(s) did you find most valuable? (You may
select more than one.)
Answered: 44 Skipped: 1
















Day 2 Lunch Table Topics
General Opportunities to Network
14 / 16
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